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NORTH CAROLINA IN THE POST WHITE
DECISION WORLD: WHERE WE ARE, HOW
WE GOT THERE, AND WHERE TO GO NEXT
J. CHRISTOPHER HEAGARTY*

I. INTRODUCTION
Of all the problems, both theoretical and practical, involved
with the election of state judges, one area has received tremendous
attention and discussion within the past two years - restrictions on
judicial campaign speech. If the epicenter of this earthquake of
debate was the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White,' then North Carolina has surely become the site
of an aftershock. Shortly after the White decision was announced,
and following the conclusion of a state Supreme Court race in
which compliance with the North Carolina Code of Judicial
Conduct was made a significant campaign issue,' North Carolina's
* Executive Director, North Carolina Center for Voter Education,
former lobbyist and campaign consultant. B.A. Multi-Disciplinary Studies /
Political Communication, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, N.C.,
1992. The author and his organization helped develop North Carolina's new
system of non-partisan, publicly financed judicial elections and North
Carolina's judicial voterguide. The author would like to acknowledge the
research contributions made by Tivey Clark, Lynn Marks, Barbara Reed, Paul
Ridgeway, Jesse Rutledge, Sarah Samis, Roy Schotland, Kim Shaw, and Greg
Nicklas. The commentary was prepared specifically for the FirstAmendment
Law Review. The judicial reform work of the North Carolina Center for
Voter Education is supported in part by grants from the Z. Smith Reynolds
Foundation. The views expressed in this commentary are those of the author
and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the Z. Smith Reynolds
Foundation.
1. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
2. See, e.g., Matthew Eisley, Complaint Filed Against Judge, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 12, 2002, at 5B; Matthew Eisley, Judging
Judges, Part 2, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 23, 2002, at 5B
[hereinafter Eisley, Judging Judges]; Matthew Eisley, Sharply Making their
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Supreme Court amended the state's judicial canon of ethics.3
What do these changes mean in terms of the conduct of
North Carolina's judicial elections and the preservation of concepts
of judicial independence and impartiality? This comment will
review the reasons these changes were made, analyze the resultant
positive and negative impacts on North Carolina's judicial elections,
and examine reforms that might be enacted to counter the possible
negative impacts. Upon examination of White and the changes in
North Carolina's Code of Judicial Conduct, this comment will
present possible avenues for keeping the symbolic "baby," a judicial
election system free from real or perceived improper conduct, while
throwing out the undesirable "bathwater" of unconstitutional
restrictions on free speech. Specifically, this comment will make
the case for the potential utility of judicial campaign conduct
committees in promoting responsible and ethical judicial campaigns
without violating First Amendment protections.
II. THE WHITE DECISION & RESPONSE

At issue in White was the "announce clause" of Minnesota's
judicial canon of conduct governing judicial campaign speech,4
which was based on the American Bar Association's 1972 Model of
Judicial Conduct. The U.S. Supreme Court found the announce

clause unconstitutional under the First Amendment.6 Shortly after
the ruling, some of America's most prominent legal organizations
expressed what could politely be called "concern" over the
decision.
Robert Hirshon, President of the American Bar
Association, called it "[a] bad decision," elaborating that "[i]t will
open a Pandora's box.... It is not the type of justice the American
Cases, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 24, 2002, at 1B; Matthew
Eisley, Voters in Dark About Judges' Ethical Records, NEWS & OBSERVER

(Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 14, 2002, at 1A [hereinafter Eisley,Voters in Dark].
3. See Order Adopting Amendments to the North Carolina Code of
Judicial

Conduct,

(Apr.

2,

2003),

available

http://www.aoc.state.nc.us/www/public/aoc/NCJudicialCode.pdf
2003 Judicial Code Amendments].

4. MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL
5. White, 536 U.S. at 768.
6. Id. at 788.

CONDUCT

at

[hereinafter

Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000).
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people want." 7
Deborah Goldberg, Deputy Director of the
Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law,

declared, "Today's decision lowers the standards for judicial
campaign conduct at exactly the wrong time.",8 Geri Palast,
Executive Director of the Justice at Stake Campaign, commented,
"More candidates will be pressured to resort to politics as usual to
become judges." 9

When North Carolina's Supreme Court amended the state's
judicial ethical canon in the wake of White in order to "get ahead of

a trend in federal court rulings and to avoid lawsuits over the state
requirements,"' 1 ° similar criticism was to follow. The amendments

removed restrictive language in broader areas of judicial campaign
speech, judicial fundraising, and partisan political activity by
judges." Defenders of the new code claimed that these changes
were logical following the ruling in White, and that the changes

were necessary to avoid any legal controversy over what candidates
legally could or could not do."

Critics of the new code, however, argued that the changes
far exceeded what was required to comply with White and other

court rulings and that it would encourage more politicking by
judicial candidates. 3 In addition, the North Carolina code changes
7. Press Release, Justice at Stake Campaign, Top Legal Organizations
Express Concern About Impact of Supreme Court's White Decision on Fair
and
Impartial
Courts
(June
27,
2002),
available
at
http://www.brennancenter.org/presscenter/releases_2002/pressrelease 2002_05
25.html.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Matthew Eisley, Code Loosens Grip on Judges, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 20, 2003, at lB.
11. See 2003 Judicial Code Amendments, supra note 3.
12. See Matthew Eisley, Jurists Deplore Relaxed Rules, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 30, 2003, at 1B [hereinafter Eisley, Relaxed
Rules]; Matthew Eisley, Judicial Politics Get Look, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 14, 2004, at 5B [hereinafter Eisley, JudicialPolitics].
13. See Jack Betts, Judges Face Temptations Under New Conduct Code,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Apr. 13, 2003, at 5D; Courts' Integrity at Stake,
WINSTON-SALEM JOURNAL, Sept. 24, 2003, at 12A; Unwise Judgment, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 27, 2003, at 22A; From the Bench to the
Gutter, WILMINGTON MORNING STAR, Oct. 12, 2003, at 6E. See also Matthew
Eisley, Court: Judges May Speak Up, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3

drew negative reactions from nationally recognized commentators
on judicial issues. Georgetown University law professor Roy
Schotland, an advisor to the American Bar Association on judicial
codes of conduct, decried them as "unbelievably extreme," adding
of the justices who revised them, "They've said, 'Let's have a
jungle."14
III. THE IMPACT OF THE WHITE DECISION IN NORTH CAROLINA

There are countless examinations of the White decision and
it is not the purpose of this comment to express support for, or
opposition to, the decision, but rather to accept the decision and
look at White-friendly options for addressing concerns over
improper campaign speech. It is necessary, however, to provide
some background information to help develop the context for the
comment's proposed actions.
What exactly does the White decision mean? Specifically, it
holds that the announce clause of Minnesota's Code of Judicial
Conduct violates the First Amendment." The announce clause, as
defined in the case, prohibits a "candidate for a judicial office" from
"announc[ing] his or her views on disputed legal or political
issues."" As suggested by the reaction of opinion leaders within the

legal community, 7 the impact of the decision reaches far beyond
Minnesota. Of the almost 9,750 state appellate court and general
jurisdiction trial court judges in America, over 8,500 face some form
of election and over 7,250 stand for contestable election." Thus, the
constitutionality of permissible speech in judicial campaigns effects,
at some level, over a majority of all state judges. This is not to say
that White had a direct effect on all of these judges. In fact, only
eight states had some version of the specific "announce clause"
June 28, 2002, at 14A.
14. Matthew Eisley, Ethics Rules Panned, NEWS &

OBSERVER

(Raleigh,

N.C.), Oct. 9, 2003, at 5B.
15. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002).
16. Id. at 768.
17. See Press Release, Justice at Stake Cmpaign,supranote 7.
18. A.B.A. TASK FORCE ON LAWYERS' POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYERS'
POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 69, 73 (1998).
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language struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court." However, the
White decision has been used to challenge other restrictions on
campaign speech 2° and to justify changes and revisions to state
codes of judicial conduct, as best evidenced by the example of
North Carolina."
North Carolina's Supreme Court changed the state's ethical
22
canons following the White decision, even though the state had
already removed the announce clause from its code of conduct in
1997.23 State judicial candidate J. Mark Brooks challenged the
Code's constitutionality after he was reprimanded by the North
Carolina State Bar for violating Canon 7B(1)(c) of the Code of
Judicial Conduct with his 1996 campaign statements that he was
"pro-life., 24 Brooks was granted a temporary restraining order on
the State Bar's action on October 18, 1996, by U.S. District Court
Judge Frank Bullock, Jr., who wrote "[t]he public has an interest in
knowing the views of candidates for elective office, and an overly
broad and vague restriction of voter information, applied in an
uneven and inconsistent manner, frustrates this interest and causes
candidates to refrain from expressing constitutionally protected
ideas., 2' But Bullock later reversed himself and on October 28,
1996, dissolved the temporary restraining order and wrote: "While
the public has an interest in knowing the views of candidates for
19. J.J. GASS,

AFTER WHITE: DEFENDING AND AMENDING CANONS OF

2
(2004),
http://www.brennancenter.org/resources/ji/ji4.pdf.
JUDICIAL

CONDUCr

available

at

20. See Smith v. Phillips, No. CIV.A.A-02CV11lJRN, 2002 WL 1870038
(W.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2002).
21. See Eisley, supra note 10; 2003 Judicial Code Amendments, supra
note 11.
22. See 2003 Judicial Code Amendments, supra note 11.
23. See Order Adopting Amendments to the Code of Judicial Conduct,
346 N.C. 806 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 Judicial Code Amendments]; see also
Joseph Neff, Judicial Elections Ungagged, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
July 16, 1997, at 1A.
24. Amy M. Craig, The Burial of an Impartial Judicial System: The
Lifting of Restrictions on Judicial Candidate Speech in North Carolina, 33
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 413,426-27 (1998).
25. Brooks v. N.C. State Bar, No. CIV.A.2:96CV00857, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16099 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 18, 1996) (order granting temporary restraining
order).
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elective office, the public also has a significant interest in elections
in which the rules are applied equally to all candidates., 26 Judge
Bullock directed the parties to bring all other interested parties
before the court so that a trial on the merits could determine the
ultimate constitutionality of Canon 7B(1)(c). 7 Threatened with the
possibility that a federal judge might declare their state Judicial
Code unconstitutional, the North Carolina Supreme Court met in
May 1997 to revise Canon 7B(1)(c) and removed the announce
clause-the section prohibiting discussion of legal or political
issues. 8
Though Brooks v. North Carolina State Bar29 was settled
before a ruling was made, the actions by the North Carolina
Supreme Court to change the codes of conduct did in fact change
the way judges campaigned in North Carolina, with some judicial
candidates taking advantage of this change in the very next
election." Whether removal of the clause was a positive or negative
development is a matter of debate," but many judges, as I have
personally observed in my professional role, continue to refrain
from discussing their personal views on issues that might come
32
Accordingly, it is appropriate to ask
before them in court.
whether the White decision actually necessitated a change to North
Carolina's judicial canons.
When the White decision was handed down, North Carolina
had just emerged from a Supreme Court race in which accusations
of violating the state's judicial canon of ethics had been made
26. Brooks v. N.C. State Bar, No. CIV.A.2:96CV00857, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16447 at *5 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 28, 1996) (order dissolving temporary
restraining order).
27. Id.
28. See Craig, supra note 24, at 430.
29. Brooks, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16099.
30. Judges Start to Speak Their Mind, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Dec. 21, 1997, at 3B.
31. For a more in-depth analysis of this code change and discussion of its
potential negative effects, see Craig, supra note 24, at 426-36.
32. This is based on my own anecdotal knowledge and awareness as an
observer of these races, and there is no evidence I can find to counter this
claim. Some exceptions exist, but the vast majority of North Carolina judicial
candidates have, in my opinion, practiced restraint in refraining from
discussing their personal views on issues that might come before them in court.
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against two incumbent appellate judges.33 It is no exaggeration to
claim that these accusations were one of the principal issues in that
campaign, that both sides claimed the accusations were politically
motivated, and that both sides thought that such tactics helped
"drag judicial races further down into muck and mire. ' 4 Yet, none
of the charges of ethics code violations were based on the announce
clause; rather, the accusations centered on issues such as political
activity and maintaining a legal practice while serving as a judge.
At the time of the White decision and prior to the 2003
revision, the North Carolina Code permitted judicial candidates to
announce their views on issues but prohibited the more serious
action of making pledges or promises of future rulings. 36 The White
decision did not specifically address this type of prohibition. In
fact, Justice Scalia wrote in the majority opinion that the
Minnesota Code contains a so-called 'pledges
or promises' clause, which separately prohibits
judicial candidates from making 'pledges or
promises of conduct in office other than the
faithful and impartial performance of the duties
of the office,' . . . a prohibition that is not
challenged here and on which we express no
view."
For those who read the White decision to mandate no more
than the simple elimination of the announce clause, North
Carolina's changes to its Code of Judicial Conduct would seem to
go too far. Cynthia Gray, director of the American Judicature
33. Eisley, Voters in Dark,supra note 2 ("Republican Justice Bob Orr of

the Supreme Court and Democrat Judge Bob Hunter of the Court of Appeals
[were] investigated for judicial misconduct ...").
34. Eisley, Judging Judges, supra note 2 (quoting N.C. Supreme Court
Justice Robert Orr).
35. See sources cited supra note 2 (describing the specific accusations
against specific judges).
36. See 1997 Judicial Code Amendments, supra note 23 (amending
Canon 7B(1)(c) to read that a candidate "should not make pledges or
promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial
performance of the duties of the office; nor misrepresent his identity,
qualifications, present position, or other fact.").
37. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 770 (2002).
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Society's Center for Judicial Ethics in Chicago, claimed the court's
action "[went] further than the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, any subsequent federal
court decision, or any subsequent code revision by any other state
supreme court., 38 J.J. Gass of the Brennan Center for Justice likens
the amendments to the North Carolina Code to an attack on the
canons "in the guise of 'reforms"' and argues, "North Carolina not
only turned the political activity regulations [of judges] on their
heads.., but also eliminated the Pledge or Promise Clause and the39
ban on candidates' personally soliciting campaign contributions.,
State lower court judges expressed their reaction through negative
comments and formal statements of condemnation issued by
governing associations representing the lower courts, including a
unanimous resolution from the Executive Committee of the
Conference of Superior Court Judges to reconsider the revisions. 1
Even Chief Justice I. Beverly Lake of the North Carolina Supreme
Court, who
would champion and defend the amendments to the
42
canons, reportedly said at the time the White ruling was
announced that he doubted whether the state's "remaining political
restrictions in4' 3the Code of Judicial Conduct [would] fall as a result
of the ruling. "
In defense of the revisions, the North Carolina Supreme
Court justices have fallen back on a broader interpretation of the
White decision, seeing it as larger than a simple repudiation of a
statutory "announce clause." For some time, Chief Justice Lake
has been skeptical, from a First Amendment standpoint, of the code
provisions relating to campaign speech. 44 Although perhaps
38. Eisley, supra note 14.
39. GASS, supra note 19, at 4.
40. See, e.g., Eisley, Judicial Politics, supra note 12 ("[Gloverning
associations of the state's Superior Court and District Court judges said the
code overhaul had gone far beyond what was necessary and would undermine
public confidence in the courts.").
41. See Eisley, Relaxed Rules, supra note 12.
42. Michael Dayton, State Supreme Court Amends Judicial Code, N.C.
LAW. WKLY., Apr. 14,2003, at 1.
43. See Eisley, supra note 13.
44. See Joseph Neff, High Court Contenders Run Quiet Race, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 2, 1992, at 2B.
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difficult to reconcile with his earlier statement that the White ruling
would not necessitate any change in the North Carolina Code,
Chief Justice Lake, in response to criticism of the amended code,
stated, "In light of the recent federal constitutional developments in
this area, one thing is clear: if you are going to have judicial
elections, you cannot deprive the candidates of their constitutional
right to participate in the political process. ' 4 5 The immediate pastpresident of the American Bar Association and noted supporter of
judicial selection reform, Alfred P. Carlton, a North Carolina
resident, also took a supportive stand, opining that the 6court's
decision.
amendments were a natural extension of the White
Indeed, the elimination of the prohibition against directly7
v. Bonner
soliciting campaign funds came after the Weaver
decision, in which the Eleventh Circuit struck down Georgia's rule
against personally soliciting campaign contributions from the
bench. 48 Also at that time, a federal district judge had recently
struck down New York's rules governing partisan political activity
by judges. 49
Yet, there is reason to believe that the trend toward striking
down further regulation of judicial speech on First Amendment
grounds may be reversing itself. Recently, challenges to pledges
and promises clauses have been defeated in New York's highest
court, the Court of Appeals. In In re Watson,5 0 the court upheld the
state's judicial canon prohibiting judges or judicial candidates from
making promises to voters that would interfere with the impartial
administration of justice. In In re Raab," the court confirmed the
constitutionality of the state judicial canon preventing judges from
engaging in partisan politics. Additionally, as mentioned earlier,
the U.S. Supreme Court in White only ruled on the announce clause
and remanded the other provisions in question to the U.S. Court of

45. Dayton, supra note 42.
46. Betts, supra note 13.
47. 309 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002).
48. Id. at 1319-20.
49. Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72
(N.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated, 351 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2003).
50. 794 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam).
51. 793 N.E.2d 1287 (N.Y. 2003).
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Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.5 The panel decision, issued in
March 2004,"3 upheld Minnesota's judicial canon prohibiting judicial
candidates from personally soliciting campaign contributions4 and
remanded the issue of restrictionsS .on 55partisan political activity to
the district court for reconsideration.
The panel decision was
vacated by the Eighth Circuit sitting en banc, and rehearing was
scheduled for October 2004.56
A final note about the interpretation of the White decision
and the amendments to North Carolina's Code of Judicial Conduct
deserves mention. Defenders of the new code suggest that Canon
157 provides sufficient protection against undesirable campaign
behavior inappropriate to the office of judge, arguing that, though
many prohibitions against specific types of campaign behavior were
removed, this canon by itself can be utilized to bring complaints of
inappropriate judicial conduct before the appropriate review
commission. There is reason to believe, however, that Canon 1
would be insufficient were it used to bring disciplinary action
against a judicial candidate for inappropriate behavior not
specifically covered by Canon 7, Section C.18 By removing the
52. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002).
53. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 361 F.3d 1035 (8th Cir. 2004),
vacated, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 10232 (8th Cir. May 25, 2004).
54. Id. at 1048-49.

55. Id. at 1047-49.
56. Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, No. 99-4021, 2,004 U.S. App.
LEXIS 10232 (8th Cir. May 25, 2004) (en banc).
57. Canon 1 provides, "A judge should uphold the integrity and
independence of the judiciary. A judge should participate in establishing,
maintaining, and enforcing, and should himself observe, appropriate standards
of conduct to ensure that the integrity and independence of the judiciary shall
be preserved." N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCF Canon 1 (2003).
58. Canon 7(C) provides,
Prohibited political conduct. A judge or a candidate
should not:
(1) solicit funds on behalf of a political party,
organization, or an individual (other than himself) seeking
election to office, by specifically asking for such
contributions in person, by telephone, by electronic
media, or by signing a letter, except as permitted under
subsection B of this Canon or otherwise within this Code;
(2) endorse a candidate for public office except as
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enumeration of so many disallowed activities and behaviors from
Canon 7, there is little context for Canon 1 interpretation. A canon
requiring only observance of "appropriate standards of conduct to
ensure that the integrity and independence of the judiciary shall be
preserved '9 seems extremely vulnerable to challenge, in that it
imposes overly broad and imprecise standards. Such was the case
in Nevada, where similar language was struck down by a federal
judge in Mahan v. Nevada Judicial Ethics and Election Practices
Commission. Furthermore, with the removal of so many of the
prohibitions in Canon 7, and no comparable set of opinions,
precedents, or rulings6
on which North Carolina's Judicial
• ° 62
Standards Commission might base their rulings, any sanction or
disciplinary action for campaign behavior in violation of Canon 1,
but not covered under Canon 7, Section C, likely would be ruled
unconstitutional. 63
permitted under subsection B of this Canon or otherwise
within this Code;
(3) intentionally and knowingly misrepresent his identity
or qualifications.
Id. Canon 7(C).
59. Id. Canon 1.
60. No. CV-D-98-01663-DAE, 2000 WL 33937547, at **5-8 (D. Nev.
Mar. 20, 2000) (holding that the NEVADA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 5A(3)(a) (2000), which provides that a judicial candidate "shall
maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office and act in a manner
consistent with the integrity and independence of the judiciary,"
unconstitutionally burdened political speech).
61. Chief Justice Lake established the Advisory Committee on
Permissible Political Conduct to help develop some guidelines for the codes,
but the committee appears to be a work in progress. See Eisley, Judicial
Politics,supra note 12.
62. The Judicial Standards Commission was established in 1973 "to
consider complaints against judges and, where appropriate, to make
recommendations for censure or removal."
JOAN G. BRANNON, THE
JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN NORTH CAROLINA 26 (2000). This commission is the
body charged with ruling on complaints based upon violations of the Judicial
Canon of Ethics. See North Carolina Judicial Standards Commission, at
http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/Standards.asp (last visited Jan.
17, 2005) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
63. Cf Mahan, 2000 WL 33937548, at **5-8 (holding that because Canon
5A(3)(a) failed to provide guidance as to specific prohibited conduct, it could
not be used to enforce sanctions imposed on a judicial candidate for his
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Thus, it would appear that the state faces a grave conflict.
On one hand, the North Carolina Supreme Court has changed the
canons governing campaign speech and political activity by judicial
candidates. It extended First Amendment protection beyond the
holding of White by amending the Code to allow not just
announcements of judicial candidate's views on disputed issues,
which were already permitted in North Carolina, 64 but to also
permit previously prohibited judicial campaign activities of other
types. Members of the court claim this was necessary in order to
"avoid the piecemeal disassembly of the North Carolina Code of
Judicial Conduct by federal courts."6 5 On the other hand, in
addition to challenging whether or not this was actually a necessary
step, critics have charged that judicial impartiality is threatened by
this new Code. 6 The conflict, therefore, is that if we accept the two
premises -(1) that previously prohibited judicial campaign speech
is constitutionally protected, but that (2) the amended, more
permissive code may endanger candidates' independence and
impartiality-then are North Carolinians faced with an inevitable,
yet constitutionally protected, erosion of impartiality and judicial
independence?
As stated, the purpose of this comment is not to judge either
side of the argument over North Carolina's Code of Judicial
Conduct. The amendments to North Carolina's Code of Judicial
Conduct are in effect, and the North Carolina Supreme Court has
indicated no intention of further amending the Code. Therefore, it
is under these amended canons that judicial campaigns must be
conducted. What remains to be determined is whether the impact
of the amendments produces any undesirable, even if mandated,
television ad depicting convicted criminals celebrating his opponent's chance
of winning).
64. See 1997 Judicial Code Amendments, supra note 23.
65. Matthew Eisley, Judges Balk at Too Much Freedom, NAT'L L.J., Oct.
17, 2003, at 7 (quoting N.C. Supreme Court Justice Mark Martin).
66. In addition to the arguments cited above and throughout section III,
many of the arguments used by critics of the amendments to North Carolina's
ethical canons of judicial speech argue that preserving judicial impartiality
ensures due process. For a more thorough examination of this argument, see
Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial
Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1059 (1996).
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effects and, if so, what can legally be done to address these effects.
IV. UNFETTERED SPEECH IN JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS:

PROS & CONS

The debate over the regulation of judicial campaign speech
is hotly contested. Professor Steve Lubet best captures the essence
of the debate when he condenses it to two sentences:
There are those who say something like, "You
don't lose your First Amendment rights simply
because you are running for judge."
The
equally emphatic response is "Oh yes you do,"
followed by the necessary explanation of which,
and how many, restrictions the First
Amendment can tolerate when it comes to
judicial campaigns. 67
Lubet sums up the debate in a nutshell, but it would be a
disservice to discuss how North Carolina might approach potential
problems with judicial campaign speech without a closer look at
some of the individual arguments by various scholars on this issue.
Is more speech in judicial campaigns a good or bad thing?
The simple answer is that it depends upon the content of what is
actually spoken. Explained another way, to quote Professor
Stephen
Gillers,
it is "an 'on the one hand, on the other hand"'
S
68
dilemma. On the one hand, since voters elect judges, voters are
naturally going to ask for information in order to cast a vote. That
means voters are going to ask about the current political issues of
the day or issues they have seen in court or in the media. On the
other hand, as Gillers explains, judicial candidates should not make
prejudicial or extrajudicial comments about the law, particularly
regarding the hot button issues on which voters may query them. 69
So then, how are they to answer?
Gillers articulates the dilemma more succinctly in a New
67. Steven Lubet, Judicial Campaign Conduct Committees: Some
ReservationsAbout an ElegantSolution, 35 IND. L. REV. 807, 808 (2002).
68. Stephen Gillers, "If Elected I Promise [
]" - What Should
JudicialCandidatesBe Allowed to Say?, 35 IND. L. REV. 725, 725 (2002).
69. Id.
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York Times article:
Free speech for judges brings benefits and
dangers. On one hand judges can increase
general understanding of the law and legal
institutions. Silencing them would deny the
public much wisdom. On the other hand, no
asset is more precious to the judiciary than
public confidence that judges are above the
fray, with no personal stake in how cases are
decided.70
Are not the two goals, unconflicted judges and informed
voters, equally worthwhile?
Voters insist that they do not have enough information
about judicial candidates and also express concern that judges are
elected for reasons other than their qualifications."
At the North Carolina Center for Voter Education, we
strive to provide voters with more information about candidates so
they can cast an informed vote. We try to explain to voters the
potential conflicts that arise from judges taking stands or making
campaign promises on controversial issues that may come before
them. We try to explain to voters the concept of recusal. Yet,
because judicial campaigns are becoming more and more like other
political campaigns, 72 voters expect the same type of poll-generated,
slogan-driven campaign materials and speeches that they are
subjected to in other races. We conduct interviews of judicial
70. Stephen Gillers, ForJustice to Be Blind, Must Judges Be Mute?, N.Y.
Mar. 4, 2001, § 4, at 3.
71. J. Christopher Heagarty, Public Opinion and an Elected Judiciary:
New Adventures for Reform, 39 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 1287, 1298-1299 (2003).
72. There are many sources for this observation. See Mike France &
Lorraine Woellert, The Battle Over the Courts - How Politics, Ideology, and
Special Interests are Compromising the US Justice System, BUSINESS WEEK,
Sept. 27, 2004, at 36. See generally DEBORAH GOLDBERG & SAMANTHA
TIMES,

SANCHEZ, JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS - 2002 (May 2004); Christopher Heagarty, The Changing Face of

JudicialElections, 7 N.C. ST. BAR J. 20, 21-22 (Winter 2002); Owen G. Abbe &
Paul S. Herrnson, How Judicial Election Campaigns Have Changed, 85
JUDICATURE 286 (May/June 2002); Nancy Perry Graham, The Best Judges
Money Can Buy, GEORGE (Dec./Jan. 2001) at 76-77, 90-92.
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candidates in which we try to ask questions that would be
appropriate under the ABA's Model Canon of Ethics, and we also
promote and manage an Internet-based voter guide that allows
candidates to list their legal and judicial experience along with a
candidate statement. 3 What they choose to say in their statement is
their choice, subject to our word limit. Since the amendments to
North Carolina's Code of Judicial Conduct in 2003, however, there
is a marked difference in the content of these statements, with more
candidates freely discussing their political affiliations and views on
specific issues.
Is this a good or a bad thing?
A. Arguments for UnrestrictedSpeech
One school of thought argues not just that restrictions on
judicial campaign speech are unconstitutional, but that the
discussion of personal views by candidates is a necessary benefit to
voters. Constitutional law Professor Erwin Chemerinsky argues
that an individual's views affect how he or she acts on the bench as
a judge,75 that those selecting a judicial candidate should consider
the views of the individual as they relate to likely performance on
76
the bench, and that restrictions on speech, such as those found in
the ABA's Model Code of Judicial Conduct, prevent candidates
from expressing their views and prevent voters from learning these
views. 7
73. N.C. Ctr. for Voter Education, N.C. VOTERED Guide to Judicial
Elections, at http://voterguide.ncvotered.com (last visited Jan. 12, 2005) (on
file with the First Amendment Law Review).
74. See N.C. Ctr. for Voter Education, at http://www.ncvoterguide.org
(last visited Jan. 5, 2005) (containing audio clips of interviews with judges and
the 2004 N.C. voter guide) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review);
N.C. Ctr. for Voter Education, at http://www.ncvotered.com (last visited Jan.
5, 2005) (containing the 2002 N.C. voter guide) (on file with the First
Amendment Law Review).
75. Erwin Chemerinsky, Restrictions on the Speech of JudicialCandidates
are Unconstitutional,35 IND. L. REv. 735, 736 (2002). Chemerinsky is now a
professor at Duke Law School; at the time of the article he was on the faculty
of the University of Southern California Law School.
76. Id. at 737.
77. Id. at 739.
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Chemerinsky presents the case that it is better for attorneys
and litigants to know where a judge stands on an issue in advance as
it makes any pre-existing bias known, providing the opportunity to
I conclude that he would believe that
address bias if it exists.
restrictions on speech simply hide bias, that the elements of bias
could exist in judges and, through canons restricting speech, this
bias would remain hidden rather than revealed through campaign
speech.
Mr. James Bopp of the James Madison Center for Free
79
Speech makes a bolder case:
Now then if you ask then the people of the
state to select those judges, to pick among
competing candidates for the responsibility of
making law that will govern the people, it is
quite appropriate for the people to say, or the
Supreme Court to say as they did in White, that
it is relevant, that the views of a judge on
disputed legal and political issues is (sic)
relevant to those who would make the law,
influenced often by those views.8°
Bopp further argues this case, asking, "What is the role of a
judge?" 81 He answers that it is "to resolve disputed legal and
political issues by announcing their views on those disputed legal
and political issues."8'
Bopp's first statement can be the subject of healthy debate.
However, his second statement erroneously blends two concepts
together, failing to make enough of a distinction between a judge
resolving disputed legal and political issues through his or her
application and understanding of relevant legal precedent versus a
78. Id. at 745.
79. James Madison Center for Free Speech, Corporate Officers,
Directors,
and
General
Counsel,
http://www.jamesmadisoncenter.org/corporateofficiers.html (sic) (last visited
Jan. 12, 2005) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
80. James Bopp, Remarks at First Amendment Law Review Symposium
on Judicial Campaign Speech (Mar. 26, 2004) (on file with N.C. Center for
Voter Education).

81. Id.
82. Id.
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judge resolving disputed legal and political issues based upon his or
her own personal views of those disputed issues. While it is
possible those personal views could be based on legal precedent, it8 3
is equally possible that they may not be. Or, to use Gillers's
vehicle to explain this distinction, on the one hand a judge may
have a deep-rooted moral opposition to the death penalty, but on
the other hand a judge may respect her sworn oath to obey the laws
and constitution of her state and her duty to apply the death
penalty if it has been properly imposed by the government. In this
example, there are two competing ways in which the judge may
form her opinion, based on her view of the general issue or on her
understanding of the law. She may not agree with the law, but she
may agree that it has been properly applied.
This argument is also flawed because when Bopp questions
criticism of judicial campaign speech and asks if it is not the role of
judges to "resolve disputed legal and political issues by announcing
their views on those disputed legal and political issues," he fails to
note the critical factor of when this announcement of views is made:
after a thorough review of the facts, law, and legal precedents in a
case. That is different from announcing an opinion prior to such a
review and gives the impression of bias before hearing all of the
facts. Announcing an opinion after such consideration would be
seen as appropriate by all, while announcing such an opinion,
without the benefits of such consideration, during a campaign
would be considered inappropriate by the supporters of regulation
of judicial campaign speech.
B. Arguments Against UnrestrictedSpeech
Those who see potential harm in unregulated judicial
campaign speech often express concern similar to that expressed in
Ackerson v. Kentucky Judicial Retirement and Removal
Commission over promises made by judicial candidates that
"impair the integrity of the court by making the candidate appear
to have pre-judged an issue without benefit of argument of counsel,
83. See Gillers, supra note 68.
84. Bopp, supra note 80.
85. 776 F. Supp. 309, 315 (W.D. Ky. 1991).
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applicable law, and the particular facts of the case. 8 6 That is, while
supporters of campaign speech regulation express concern about
bias, it is not assumed that simply having a personal belief on an
issue equates to bias, but rather that bias will override the complete
consideration or full deliberation a judge should give to every case,
especially when expressed in the form of a pledge or a promise
during a campaign that could impair such consideration.
Let us consider the arguments made by those who take the
opposite point of view from Bopp over the legality of the regulation
of judicial campaign speech. Opponents fear that judges would be
elected who promise to resolve disputed legal and political issues
based on their pre-existing views of an issue, giving those views
precedence over the written law. Or, they fear judges would be
elected based upon the public belief that they would allow their
own personal beliefs to take precedence over the law.
Opponents of Bopp's position believe that regulation of
judicial speech does serve a compelling state interest and that there
is potential harm in the pledges and promises of judicial candidates
to rule a certain way in future cases. They argue that canons
restricting speech serve three interests of constitutional magnitude:
the separation of powers, the rights of litigants to impartial courts,
and the preservation of public confidence in the courts.87
These critics of unregulated judicial campaign speech point
to Ackerson, a pre-White case, which states that there "is a
compelling state interest in so limiting a judicial candidate's speech
because the making of campaign commitments on issues likely to
come before the court tends to undermine the fundamental fairness
and impartiality of the legal system," '8 as a compass pointing to the
proper interpretation of the constitutionality of speech restrictions.
Professor Robert O'Neil, Director of the Thomas Jefferson
Center for the Protection of Free Expression, sides in this instance
with those seeking regulation of judicial campaign speech, arguing
that "the core concern is nothing less than ensuring due process for
litigants." 89 He presents the debate over the issue as a question
86. GASS, supra note 19, at 13.

87. See id. at 5-9.
88. Ackerson, 776 F. Supp. at 315.
89. Robert M. O'Neil, The Canons in the Courts: Recent First
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posed by Indiana Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard about whether a
legal review of canons restricting judicial speech should be confined
to First Amendment issues, or whether the judge should place more
value on the ability of the courts to afford litigants due process of
law in individual cases and affirm canons designed to prevent
political speeches that will diminish the court's ability to render
impartial justice and ability to be viewed as impartial. 90 O'Neil and
Shepard's answer, obviously, is the latter.
If a state may not deny a person the equal protection of the
9
laws, ' can it deny a litigant a trial deemed fair and impartial, as
defined by a hearing by a judge who has not already expressed
prejudicial opinions on the subject matter before the case is heard,
or who has not, through his campaign speech, suggested a lack of
open-mindedness toward the arguments of both parties?
O'Neil argues as well for the interest in preserving judicial
integrity and limiting political partisanship, as well as for
maintaining a level of professionalism and civility within the
judiciary.92

Gass discusses the dangers of pledges and promises, both
for particular cases and for classes of cases, explaining that they can
"create the impression that voters can guarantee [the outcome of
those cases or types of cases] - no matter what the fact and law
require - by choosing a particular candidate." 93
Gass argues further that even the impression, be it true or
false, that judges would uphold these promises would appear to be94
a clear bias for a particular class or a refusal to be "open minded"
enough to provide litigants a fair trial, and thus would be damaging
to the public's perception and confidence in the impartiality of the
courts. At worst, he argues judicial candidates could feel a moral or
political obligation to fulfill his or her end of the bargain once on

Amendment Rulings, 35 IND. L. REV. 701, 715 (2002).
90. Id.
91. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
92. O'Neil, supra note 89, at 712-15.
93. GASS, supra note 19, at 18.
94. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 778 (2002)
("Openmindedness" is a concept described by Justice Scalia in the majority
opinion in White as one of the possible definitions of "impartiality.").
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the bench, "compromising or eliminating the openmindedness and
lack of bias towards parties that are essential to judging."95
This concern over the threat that pledges and promises pose
to public confidence in the judiciary is also expressed in the Watson
decision, where it is stated:
Such promises, even if they are not kept once a
candidate is elected, damage the judicial system
because the newly elected judge will have
created a perception that will be difficult to
dispel in the public mind.
With all the
uncertainties inherent in litigation, litigants and
the bar are entitled to be free of the additional
burden of wondering whether the judge to
whom their case is assigned will adjudicate it
without bias or prejudice and with a mind that
is open enough to allow reasonable
consideration of the legal and factual issues
presented. 96
Justice O'Connor admits as much in her concurrence with
the White decision, stating, "Even if judges were able to suppress
their awareness of the potential electoral consequences of their
decisions and refrain from acting on it, the public's confidence in
the judiciary could be undermined simply by the possibility that
judges would be unable to do so." 9
Justice Ginsberg, in her dissent against the White decision,
describes how campaign pledges and promises could go so far as to
suggest a quid pro quo between voters and candidates. 98
Essentially, restrictions on judicial campaign speech are designed to
prohibit such a quid pro quo, even a perceived one between
candidates and voters or campaign contributors. Specifically, the
restrictions are intended to prevent the kind of situation that arises
when a candidate tells a campaign contributor or special interest
group, "Vote for me, I believe in X and Y," when X and Y
represent positions on issues likely to come before the court that
95. GASS, supra note 19, at 18.

96. In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2003).
97. White, 536 U.S. at 789 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
98. Id. at 820 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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are also of direct interest to the contributor or interest group in
question.
When such a quid pro quo, real or perceived, is made, it
threatens the notion of judicial independence and impartiality held
dear by so many jurists and scholars. There is recognized legal
precedent upholding the value of the perceived fairness of the court
system. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Mistretta v. United
States99 that "[w]hile the problem of individual bias is usually cured
through recusal, no such mechanism can overcome the appearance
of institutional partiality that may arise from judiciary involvement
in the making of policy. The legitimacy of the Judicial Branch
ultimately depends on its reputation for impartiality and
nonpartisanship."'°

Even Chemerinsky, a foe of restrictions on judicial speech,
will concede there is a significant problem in the inherent tension
between judicial elections and judicial independence. He states
that "the need for judicial candidates to raise ever increasing
amounts of campaign funds when their primary financial supporters
01' a
are lawyers and litigants is inimical to judicial independence,"'
102
fact upheld by numerous independent sources.
He relates a
personal story of a California Superior Court judge describing how
his various jurist peers on their lunch break openly and casually
discuss which firms contribute the most money to their campaigns
before returning to the bench to hear and decide cases involving
those very same lawyers. 1°3
This is where, I believe, the arguments for the regulation of
judicial speech start to evolve beyond promoting an aspirational
code of how judges should conduct their campaigns and where they
begin to demonstrate themselves as a remedy against the corrupting
influence the exchange of money has over public confidence.
99. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
100. Id. at 407.

101. Chemerinsky, supra note 75, at 736.
102. See generally DEBORAH GOLDBERG,

CRAIG HOLMAN,
&
SAMANTHA SANCHEZ, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS (Mar.

2004), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/JASMoneyReport.pdf;
see also A.B.A. TASK FORCE ON LAWYERS' POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS, supra

note 18, at pt. 2.
103. Chemerinsky, supra note 75, at 736.

130

FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 3

Everyone seems to fancy quoting former California
Supreme Court Justice Otto Kaus's statement that "deciding
controversial cases while facing reelection" and trying to ignore the
political consequences of visible decision is "like ignoring a
crocodile in your bathtub. ' '° But take the analogy a bit further:
when judicial candidates make pledges or promises about specific
issues of interest to campaign contributors, when the contributors
give their money to the candidates, and when those candidates win,
the public, when asked to believe, no matter how true, that these
donations could not possibly constitute a quid pro quo
arrangement, attribute to these statements the same sincerity as
crocodile tears.
Such is evidenced by numerous public opinion polls in
North Carolina,' °5 other states,'06 and nationwide.'o Nationally,
nearly seventy-one percent of Americans stated that they believe
that campaign contributions from interest groups have at least some
influence on judges' decisions in the courtroom. Over eighty
percent of African-Americans expressed this view, including a
majority (fifty-one percent) who said contributions carried a "great
deal" of influence.'9
Such cynicism about judicial campaign financing extends to
the motivations behind a judicial candidate's choice to express
views or to make pledges or promises on disputed issues. The same
survey revealed that eighty-two percent of Americans are very or
somewhat concerned that the decision in Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White (explained in the poll as "permitting candidates

104. Id. at 735; see also Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765,
789 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Julian E. Eule, Crocodiles in the
Bathtub: State Courts, Voter Initiatives and the Threat of Electoral Reprisal, 65
U. COLO. L. REV. 733,739 (1994)).
105. Heagarty, supra note 71, at 1306.
106. A Pennsylvania survey of 500 respondents revealed 88% of those
polled believed judges to be influenced by big donors at least sometimes. See
An Interview with Roy Schotland, CT. REV., Fall 1998, at 17.
107. See Zogby Int'l, March 2004 Survey Highlights: Americans Speak
Out on JudicialElections, at http://faircourts.org/files/ZogbyPollFactSheet.pdf

(last visited Jan. 12, 2005) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review);
see also Heagarty, supra note 71, at 1306.

108. Zogby Int'l, supra note 107.
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for judicial office to announce views on disputed issues") will result
in special interest groups pressuring judicial candidates to stake out
positions on controversial issues. More than seventy percent in
every demographic subgroup are somewhat or very concerned.
Those most concerned include Americans over fifty years of age,
residents of Southern states, and those who are strongly ideological
(progressive or very conservative).
One might dismiss such numbers as the product of a public
generally uninformed or uneducated about the workings of the
judiciary or without a deep understanding of judicial ethics.
However, a 1999 survey of Texas state judges conducted by that
state's Supreme Court and bar association found that almost half
believed that campaign contributions did have a significant effect
Nationally, a survey of appellate and
on courtroom decisions.1
trial court judges produced somewhat less striking but still
significant results."
In a world of loosened restrictions of campaign speech,
particularly in areas where candidates may not only announce their
views but make pledges and promises and directly solicit
contributions, is it so unreasonable to believe that special interest
group involvement in elections, both in the form of contributions
and endorsements, will increase? Organizations such as the Justice
at Stake Campaign are documenting this very phenomenon, from
issue-advocacy organizations using White as justification to demand
answers to specific questions on issues of abortion, homosexual
rights, and tort reform, to an increase in third-party issue-advocacy
based advertising in support or opposition to the
• 112"judicial agendas"
of various judicial candidates around the nation.
C. Case Studies
While not to diminish the potential threat to judicial
109. Id.
110. Heagarty, supra note 71, at 1307.
111. Id. at 1307. About one third of high court judges believe
contributions have a great deal of influence on judicial elections, about one
quarter of trial court judges expressed the same opinion.
112. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 102, at 23-25.
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independence
from
such
special-interest
activity,
the
constitutionality of restrictions on electioneering speech by issueadvocacy and political organizations is an issue I will not examine
here. Rather, I think it is more appropriate to provide two case
studies of judicial campaign speech that go beyond the restrictions
of the ABA's model canon in these early days of the post-White
era. Will these serve as definitive proof that such speech is either
good or bad? No, that will remain, I believe, a judgment for the
reader to make. But there is value in moving these discussions
from the theoretical to an examination of the practical applications
of less-restricted campaign speech. The examples below are also
interesting in the contrasting ways candidates engaging in more
speech have chosen to talk about it. Arguably, good points are
made both for and against speaking on issues through these
candidates' words and deeds. Also, by documenting these actions,
perhaps some future enterprising researcher may examine this sort
of campaign behavior in connection with the opinions and
performance of these judges as they serve their elected terms.
In 2003, Pennsylvania held elections for state Supreme
Court justice and other statewide judicial posts for the first time
since the White decision was handed down. ' Pennsylvania, like
Minnesota, utilized a judicial canon of ethics that had restricted
candidates from announcing their views on disputed legal issues,
and, prior to the White decision, a federal court had enjoined its
enforcement in a 1991 judicial election. The injunction was later
vacated, but not before a candidate's announcement had been
circulated in newspapers that "the
testimony of police was more
1 4
reliable than that of defendants.

In post-White elections, Pennsylvania judicial candidates
were no longer constrained by an announce clause but were still
governed by Canon 7 (B)(1)(c) of their Code of Judicial Conduct
from making statements that "commit or appear to commit the
113. PENNSYLVANIANS FOR MODERN CTS., As PENNSYLVANIA GOES, SO
GOES THE NATION: A CASE STUDY OF A SUPREME COURT ELECrION IN THE
POST-WHITE
ERA
2,
5-6
(Aug.
2004),
available
at

http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/PennsylvaniaReport.pdf.
114. Emily Heller, Electing Judges: The New Freedom - A Candidate's
Views on Abortion, Torts, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 20,2004, at 1, 26.
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candidate with respect to cases, controversies, or issues that are
likely to come before the court.""' 5 These canons were in place
before the 2003 elections began.16
Special interest groups and issue advocacy organizations are
reported to have increased their activity, particularly in issuing
surveys to judicial candidates, some specifically citing the White
decision as justification for requesting candidates specifically to
declare positions on hot-button campaign issues, some of which
could likely appear before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court."' Bert
Brandenburg, spokesperson for the Justice at Stake Campaign,
predicted that interest groups would use the White case as a "new
tool" in an aggressive push to encourage judicial candidates to take
positions on controversial
-- . 118 issues, luring them with the promise of
contributions.
campaign
Pennsylvania's sole Supreme Court race featured Max Baer,
a Democrat Alleghany trial court judge, running against Joan Orie
Melvin, a Republican state appellate judge." 9 The two candidates
took very different views of appropriate campaign behavior after
White. Melvin took the position that, despite White, it was
inappropriate and problematic for candidates to discuss disputed
She explained that while expressing
legal and political issues.
particular views might engender support from certain political
groups, such action might also create expectations of specific
outcomes in court, even if the candidate explains that his or her
views do not constitute a promise. Such expectations undercut fair
hearings. 121 "Your personal opinion is totally irrelevant when you
are applying the rule of law to facts," stated the Republican
122
appellate judge.
Baer took a much different approach, claiming that
"[t]alking about your views lets voters align with candidates with
115. See PENNSYLVANIANS

FOR MODERN Crs.,

supra note 113, at 2.

116. Id. at 2, 5-6.
117. Id.
118. Heller, supra note 114, at 26.
119. Emily Heller, He Speaks on Issues, Wins State Court Seat - The
Election Tested the New Right to Take a Stand, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 10, 2003, at 7.

120. Heller, supra note 114, at 26.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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whom they share 'a vision of life,'' and that he agreed with the
White decision because "gagging candidates violated their free
speech rights.",12' However, Baer emphasized that he had to "make
it very clear" that his view is not a prediction of how he'd rule in an
124
actual case.
Baer would state after the campaign that "it's better that the
public knows what you stand for"'2 5 as explanation for his free
discussion of his support for labor unions and gun control and his
126
opposition to abortion and capping tort judgments.
This difference became central to their highly competitive
campaign, with Melvin championing the concept of judicial
impartiality and Baer crusading against voter ignorance. Voter
education was the point Baer seems to have utilized the most as
justification for breaking this long-running judicial campaign speech
taboo. In televised debates between Baer and Melvin, Baer would
argue a position I believe to be similar to arguments made by James
Bopp during the First Amendment Law Review's Symposium on
Judicial Campaign Speech, that "you wouldn't want a judge on
the bench who didn't have opinions, who didn't have sufficient life
experiences, who hadn't thought about things enough, didn't care
In
passionately about society enough to have opinions."'
arguments that likely resonated with the voters, Baer took this
reasoning a step further, saying, "And where [Melvin] and I differ is
that I'm willing to tell you [my beliefs], because I don't think an
ignorant voter, an ill-informed voter is a good thing."'2 9 Of course,
to ensure that his statements remained definable as
"announcements" and not "commitments," Baer added, "And so I
tell you, with the caveat that I still am going to do my job as a
judge[;]' 130 or, in other words, that he could base his opinions on the
law and facts rather than these announced opinions.

123. Id.

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 1.
Heller, supra note 119, at 7.
Id.
Bopp, supra note 80.
PENNSYLVANIANS FOR MODERN COURTS, supra note 113, at 4.

Id.
Id.
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Melvin, on the other hand, employed arguments similar to
those offered by O'Neil,"' Gass, and other supporters of ethical
speech restrictions, stating,
Members of the public need to believe that
they have an even playing field. When you are
going out speaking on the issues, the public
believes there is a predisposition that this judge
will rule consistently with what their personal
beliefs are. Impartiality of the courts is a
fundamental prerequisite to a fair hearing, and
that can be deemed compromised by
appearances alone.... It's the appearance and
the due process rights of litigants. 33'
Another area of fundamental difference in this debate is
seen in Baer's statements regarding his announcement of his
opposition to caps on non-economic damages in all tort cases. Baer
explained that his opposition to the caps did not mean he would
vote against them should the issue come before the court, claiming
that if another tort reform measure passed the legislature and was
approved by referendum, he would abide by it.-' However, despite
taking a vocal public stand on the issue, Baer went on to say that he
135
would not recuse himself in such a case if he were elected.
Melvin put a higher standard on recusal, explaining that the
recusal issue was one of the reasons she refrained from discussing
issues that might appear in court. As Pennsylvania's standard for
mandatory recusal is whether "a significant minority" would
reasonably question the court's impartiality, Melvin questioned
how an outspoken judge could avoid frequent recusals.13
The results of this race? No single supreme court race held
anywhere in America during that 2002-2003 cycle proved to be
more expensive than this Pennsylvania seat. 7 Contributions to the

131. O'Neil, supra note 89.
132. GASS, supra note 19.

133. PENNSYLVANIANS FOR MODERN
134. Heller, supra note 114, at 26.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. PENNSYLVANIANS FOR MODERN

CTS.,

supra note 113, at 4.

CTS.,

supra note 113, at 3.
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two candidates topped $3.34 million, with Baer raising over
$400,000 more than Melvin, and this number does not include any
of the third party expenditures made in support of or against either
candidate."" Baer won by about 52% of the vote, which is even
more impressive considering that, according to St. Joseph's
University Professor Randall M. Miller, Democrats had previously
been dominated by Republicans, who had filled nearly every
statewide office. 139 Newspapers praised and endorsed Baer for his
"openness," and, when asked whether he credited his victory to his
1' °
outspoken promotion of his views, Baer confirmed, "Absolutely."
The second case study focuses on North Carolina. In 2002,
one of the two state Supreme Court races made headlines with both
candidates in the race having to defend themselves against
accusations of violating the judicial canon of ethics. 1' This case
study, however, will examine the other race, in which no complaints
appear to have been filed, as the events of this race raised
important First Amendment issues.
To review, while North Carolina had removed the announce
142
clause language from its canons, limitations still remained in 2002
on what constituted acceptable judicial campaign speech. But did
those limitations apply to all candidates or only those currently
serving in some judicial office? Rule 8.2 of the North Carolina
Rules of Professional Conduct for attorneys states that "a lawyer
who is a candidate for judicial office shall comply with applicable
provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct.', 43 Further, Comment
Two to this rule specifies, "When a lawyer seeks judicial office, the
lawyer should be bound by applicable limitations on political
activity."' 4 And, as noted, while there was no "announce clause" or
any sort of prohibition on announcingviews, Canon 7(B)(c) clearly
stated that candidates "should not make pledges or promises of
conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
Heller, supra note 119, at 7.
Id.
See generally sources cited supra note 2.
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
N.C. REVISED RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 8.2 (2004).
Id. at cmt. 2.
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of the duties of the office.,
The application of the code to non-judges is significant to
note because one of the candidates, Republican Edward Brady, was
a decorated military veteran and criminal defense attorney from
Fayetteville with an extensive death penalty trial practice but no

judicial experience. '6

During the 2002 Republican primary,47

Brady defeated North Carolina Court of Appeals Judge Ralph
Walker, 1' despite Walker's receiving the endorsement of every49
major legal group and every major newspaper in the state.1
Walker's defeat was a surprise to most political observers, with
some well respected attorneys admitting they had been unaware
that Walker was even opposed: 5°
While many theories have been advanced, it has been noted
that Brady campaigned aggressively and derided his veteran jurist
opponent as a "moderate Republican."' 5'
There is little
documented information available about Brady's primary
campaign, as much of the campaign was conducted through direct
mail. Nevertheless, in Brady's next contest, a general election
campaign against incumbent North Carolina Supreme Court Justice
G.K. Butterfield, many of his election materials were made
public."'
In one letter to Republican voters, Brady wrote, "I need
your support on my crusade.', 5 3 In another, he pledged, "You may
be assured that I will support our Republican agenda as the newest
associate justice of the court."'54 In yet another letter, he made the

145. N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(c) (1999).
146. Matthew

Eisley,

Stark

Contrast Marks Hopefuls,

NEWS

&

OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 30,2002, at lB.
147. The 2002 election was the last in which North Carolina appellate
judges ran in partisan primaries. See Act of Oct. 10, 2002, ch.163, 4, 2002 N.C.
Sess. Laws 626.
148. Eisley, supra note 146.

149. Bob Burtman, Silence of the Lambs, INDEP.
Nov. 20-27, 2002, at 5.
150. Id.
151. Eisley, supra note 146.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.

WKLY

(Durham, N.C.),
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following promise:
Our nation's decline of its core family values
and traditions, abortion issues, gay rights, and
the Democratic liberal partisan interpretation
by the Supreme Court of Florida arising out of
the 2000 president [sic] election are some of the
issues of recent years which have brought me to
the irreversible conclusion that I must do my
part in seeking this office so as to address these
and other critical issues.15
Brady's letters defined an agenda that included opposing
abortion except in cases of rape, incest, or danger to the mother's
life, and defending the gun-ownership rights of law-abiding
citizens. 6
Like Judge Melvin in Pennsylvania, Brady's opponent,
Justice G.K. Butterfield, was critical of this style of campaigning
and instead tried to promote his own judicial experience. Justice
Butterfield was a veteran Superior Court trial judge before he was
appointed to fill a vacancy on the Supreme Court.5 7 He stated of
his opponent:
The last thing we need in our judicial system is
judges or candidates who have an agenda. We
don't need judges who write their supporters,
lay out their political ideology, and promise to
take their ideology to the court. That is what
my opponent is doing. That tells me he does
not understand the proper role of a judge.
Brady, however, refuted this characterization, telling the
media that he admitted the state Supreme Court cannot outlaw
abortion, but maintaining that making his views known benefits
voters by helping them make their choice in the election. 9 He also
stated plainly to the press, "I have no political agenda."'"
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.

158. Id.
159. Id.

160. Id.
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The issue of partisanship in North Carolina's 2002 elections
is interesting as different candidates took different views of the
issue, though perhaps none as stark as Brady's. Sanford Steelman,
a Republican Superior Court judge who ran for and won a seat in
that year's Court of Appeals elections, expressed his opinion that
161
party affiliation "gives voters some idea where candidates stand.,
But fellow Republican candidate Eric Levinson, a Charlotte
District Court judge who also won election to the Court of Appeals,
took the strategy of trying to reach beyond Republicans to "as
many people as possible."1 62 He would explain, "Everybody agrees
that politics doesn't have anything to do with what we do inside the
court room.'

63

In addition to his past judicial experience and the position
that he had "much greater qualifications for the job," Butterfield
ran on the argument that his presence as an African-American
brought needed diversity to the court.16' Brady did not approve of
this appeal, calling it "terribly wrong" and arguing that race should
not enter into the debate, refusing to label himself as "the
European-American" candidate.

As for the argument over who

was better qualified, Brady responded, "I'm eminently qualified to
do this. I'm very focused, very dedicated. It's my way of paying
back. It's public service. Somebody needs to do it. Somebody
needs to take a stand."'6 As noted above, Brady claimed that he
had no agenda.167 Yet in the following statements documented in
his campaign materials, Brady appears to make clear reference to
supporting an agenda: "I need your support on my crusade[;]''1 68 "I

will support our Republican agenda[;]' 69 "someone needs to take a
stand[;]" 70 and "I must do my part in seeking this office to address
161. Matthew Eisley, Getting Mileage From Parties,NEWS & OBSERVER

(Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 23, 2002, at lB.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
16&
169.
170.

Id.
Id.
Eisley, supra note 146.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
Eisley, supra note 161 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
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these and other critical issues.",7 1 In a post-election interview with
the Charlotte Observer, Brady appeared to liken his statements to
announcements rather than pledges, stating that he will base his
decisions on the facts of each case, not on his own private political
views. 172 "As a judge or a justice, you are entitled to your views, but
177

that would never enter into my decisions," Brady stated. 73 While
such a statement is comforting, its post-election timing and absence
from the campaign materials-where these views and proposed
actions are detailed-does little to ameliorate his previous
campaign behavior.
This case would be extremely troubling to observers like
Gass, who have already warned of the dangers of judges making
pledges and promises. 74 How could these statements not create the
impression that Brady's voters could expect his support for the
favorable outcome of cases restricting abortion rights, protecting
gun ownership, or supporting a partisan agenda? And of course,
the greatest threat is the one unspoken by most critics: that a judge
making these kinds of statements might actually fulfill these
election promises at the expense of providing a fair and impartial
hearing on these matters.
Taking a hard critical approach to unfettered judicial
campaign speech, the question emerges as to which is the greater
offense: the possibility that a candidate could deliberately mislead
voters into believing he or she would be favorably inclined to
support issues of concern to them when hearing cases in court, or
the possibility of a judge actually honoring such statements and
being so predisposed?
If one took a more permissive view of unfettered judicial
campaign speech, one might retort that, if such biases do in fact
exist, it is preferable that voters be aware of them in advance of the
election. Further, if voters choose to make decisions based on such
information, such is their right.
171. Id. (emphasis added).
172. Eric Frazier, Lawyer's Election Raises Concerns, CHARLOTrE
OBSERVER, Nov. 7, 2002, at 6B.
173. Id.
174. GASS, supra note 19, at 13 (citing Ackerson v. Ky. Judicial Ret. &
Removal Comm'n, 776 F. Supp. 309, 315 (W.D. Ky. 1991)).
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The issues of pledges and promises that trouble Gass and
others, however, would appear to be of little concern to the
majority of North Carolina voters in 2002. Despite Justice G.K.
Butterfield earning, as did Judge Ralph Walker, the endorsement
175
of every major legal organization and every major newspaper,
Edward Brady defeated him with fifty-four percent of the vote to
Butterfield's forty-six percent.
Again, I hope these case studies provide some contrasting
real-life examples of how the theoretical arguments about campaign
speech translate into practical application. I am unable to answer
whether or not the campaign speech described here - announced
positions or pledges and promises of behavior - has or will result in
bias in the performance of either judge's duties, and would not
presume to make such a prediction. I merely use these case studies
to provide a real-world example for purposes of examining the
disputed behavior and helping to frame the debate.
D. A Problem Looking for an Answer
At this point, it is probably clear that I agree that there are
many compelling public policy justifications behind the limitation of
judicial campaign speech. These justifications serve to preserve due
process, to uphold public confidence in the judiciary, and to prevent
the proliferation of undue special interest influence over the
outcome of judicial elections.
However, as evidenced by
177
Chemerinsky's admission above, one can recognize the many
ways that irresponsible judicial campaign speech can threaten
judicial independence but
still
make a case that restrictions on such
• •
171
speech are unconstitutional.
I close this section feeling that I have confirmed Lubet's
description of the debate over judicial campaign speech as accurate.
While Lubet leaves the constitutional question over judicial
campaign speech open to debate, he argues, and I agree, that the
175. Burtman, supra note 149.
176. Election Results, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, Nov. 7, 2002, at 3B.
177. Chemerinsky, supra note 75, at 735-36.
178. Id. at 742-46 (arguing that restrictions on political speech of judicial
candidates fail to meet strict scrutiny).
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principles behind regulation of judicial campaign speech are noble,
that "the public and the judiciary are better served when judicial
campaigns are clean and honest, and most especially when the
candidates refrain from committing themselves to future rulings.
There is simply no good argument in favor of turning judicial
elections into referenda on specific outcomes."' 79
Justice Paul De Muniz of the Oregon Supreme Court writes
of the dangers of outcome-determinative criticism,' 8° stating
specifically that such criticism "implies that a judge should always
reach a particular outcome regardless of the law.""18 Pledges and
promises in judicial races promote public focus solely on the
outcome of decisions rather than the process by which the decisions
are reached, which is a disservice to voters and misleads them as to
how courts are supposed to function. De Muniz provides the
practical illustration of a judge or court excluding critical evidence
under the constitutionally mandated exclusionary rule of the Fourth
Amendment.
A ruling of this kind can lead to the release of a
violent felon or the perpetrator of a brutal or heinous crime.
Making such a ruling can imperil that judge in the public eye if
exploited by opposing candidates or organizations. 82 This situation
creates the impression, in terms of harsh practical politics, that
"judges are free to ignore the law in favor of the perceived will of
the majority.''8

Returning to Gass's warning about candidates feeling a
moral or political obligation to fulfill his or her political promises
once on the bench, 85 there is, in fact, research to suggest that the
politicization of judicial decisions and political issues in campaigns
might affect judicial behavior. In death penalty cases, one study
found that politicization of the issue in California, Tennessee, and
South Carolina has "affected state court behavior" and resulted in
179. Lubet, supra note 67, at 809.
180. Paul J. De Muniz, PoliticizingState Judicial Elections: A Threat to
JudicialIndependence, 38 WILLAMETFE L. REv. 367,387 (2002).
181. Id. at 388.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 388-89.
184. Id. at 388.
185. GASS, supra note 19, at 13.
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lower reversal rates following political campaigns.' 86
If this research is valid, is it then too unreasonable to
connect the dots and to claim that certain judicial campaign speech
may obligate some candidates to voters, perhaps biasing their
rulings, even if this might only occur very rarely? Is it not possible
that, despite the honorable behavior of thousands of men and
women who serve as elected judges, the political benefits to be
reaped by judicial campaign speech that wins votes might tempt at
least a few candidates each election cycle?
In other words, regardless of the debate over whether
judicial canons restricting campaign speech are constitutional, we
recognize this problem exists and, for the most part, agree that
something should be done about it. Without a new legal challenge
to specifically affirm the constitutionality of certain limits on
judicial speech, it is unlikely that the problems with judicial speech
in judicial elections, which were clearly acknowledged by Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy in White, will be solved in North Carolina
by further amending the Judicial Canon of Ethics. Instead, we must
look to other solutions that will address these problems while still
complying with the White decision. Luckily, some options exist.
V. THE CHALLENGES FACING SUGGESTED OPTIONS FOR
REFORM IN NORTH CAROLINA

There are several ways North Carolina could avoid the
potential pitfalls and harms related to judicial campaign speech.
The first proposed solution is the simplest in terms of eliminating
the problem, but is also likely to be the most difficult to implement:
eliminating judicial campaigns. Selecting judges through a merit
based, or even a politically-based, appointive system would remove
many of the concerns associated with judicial campaign speech.
Justice O'Connor clearly favors such an approach. In her
concurring opinion in White, she acknowledged the conflicts
created by campaign speech in judicial elections and blamed the
state's method of judicial selection rather than the allowable
186. De Muniz, supra note 180, at 389 (citing John Blume & Theodore
Eisenberg, Judicial Politics, Death Penalty Appeals, and Case Selection: An
EmpiricalStudy, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 465, 503 (1999)).
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conduct within judicial elections:
Minnesota has chosen to select its judges
through contested popular elections instead of
through an appointment system or a combined
appointment and retention election system
along the lines of the Missouri Plan. In doing
so the State has voluntarily taken on the risks
to judicial bias described above. As a result,
the State's claim that it needs to significantly
restrict judges' speech in order to protect
judicial impartiality is particularly troubling. If
the State has a problem with judicial
impartiality, it is largely one the State brought
upon itself by continuing the practice of
popularly electing judges.
In her view, the appropriate solution would be to implement
a new judicial selection process, not restrict judicial speech.
Although the elimination of elections would alleviate many of the
conflicts examined in this comment, such action would leave other
public policy and separation of powers questions unanswered.
North Carolina's Supreme Court, in answering questions
and criticism of their amendments to the codes of judicial conduct,
has offered the alternative of a judicial selection via appointment.
The justices have explained that their changes were necessary if
judges continue to be selected via election rather than an
appointive system.18
O'Connor's implied solution of eliminating judicial elections
solves the problem of troublesome campaign speech, as the
problem would no longer exist. Additionally, the North Carolina
State Bar Association endorses replacing judicial elections with a
system of merit-based appointment.
However, these
187. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 792 (2002)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
188. Gary Wright, Revised Conduct Code Lets Judges Talk Issues,
Apr. 11, 2003, at lB.
189. See N.C. State Bar Ass'n, Judicial Selection in North Carolina, at
http://www.ncbar.org/public/communications/j udicialSelection.aspx
(last
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER,

visited Jan. 12, 2005) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
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endorsements have failed to gain acceptance in the state
legislature.' 9° O'Connor's solution is far easier said than done, and
most scholars acknowledge this. Among those already cited in this
article, O'Neil states plainly that we should assume judges will
continue to be elected. 9'

Chemerinsky concurs, explaining,

"judicial elections are here to stay; there is no indication that states
with such systems for choosing and retaining judges are likely to
abandon them."' 92 Roy Schotland puts it more bluntly when he
reviews the ninety-eight year history of attempts to end contestable
elections, noting recent defeats in Texas and Florida of merit-based
selection proposals and the lack of any real progress in decades.' 93

By his calculations, if progress towards merit-based appointment
continues at its current pace, we will see the end of contestable
elections for appellate court judges in about 160 years.' 94 And that
is the good news; ending contestable elections for the trial courts
would take, at its current pace, about 770 years.195

My own research into this subject confirms that North
Carolina is not likely to move to an appointment-based system of
judicial selection anytime soon, nor will any other state until
significant shifts are made in public opinion.'9 Even if approved by
a legislature, almost any shift from an elected to an appointmentbased system will require the amendment of a state's constitution,
and that requires a popular vote of the people.' 97 Studies of public

opinion nationwide reveal a reluctance to abandon elections in
favor of appointing judges, and North Carolina appears to be more
resistant to this than other states.198

This is not to say that the notion of an appointment-based
system should be abandoned. Rather, this should serve as a reality190. The recent history of the legislation concerning merit selection is
briefly revisited in Wright, supra note 188.
191. O'Neil, supra note 89, at 714.
192. Chemerinsky, supra note 75, at 736.
193. Roy A. Schotland, Address at the N.C. Bar Association Continuing
Legal Education Seminar (Oct. 7, 2004).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Heagarty, supra note 71, at 1290-1305.
197. Id. at 1291-92. Delaware remains an exception. Id.
198. Id. at 1300-02.
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check that such a solution is not coming any time soon, and not
without significant shifts in public opinion. Advocates for an
appointment-based system must develop a new way to talk about
the issue that resonates with the average voter. Rhetoric used in
legislatures and in communications with the legal community falls
flat when used to persuade non-lawyers. The concept of "judicial
independence" can be interpreted as an argument for the election
of judges, keeping judges "independent" of the politicians. An
ABA Harris poll study found a large majority of citizens believed
that elected, not appointed, judges were in fact more fair and
impartial.' 99 Until those attitudes change, an appointive system is,
at best, more of a long-term goal than a practical solution.
Moreover, without any new ideas or any new approach for how to
change those attitudes, there is no reason to believe the glacial pace
towards ending judicial elections will accelerate.
A potential reform that shows a bit more promise for
acceptance in the near-term would be a shift toward what are
commonly known as retention elections. Each election year, the
voters would have the opportunity to vote on judges who are near
the end of their term. But unlike candidates for public office, the
judges would not have a named opponent on the ballot. Rather,
the public is asked to vote whether or not to retain the judge for
another term. If a judge receives a simple majority of "yes" votes,
the judge may serve another full term. Generally, retention
elections take place after an initial appointment of a judicial
candidate to office after an apolitical screening process, but there
Justice O'Connor has advocated for this
are some variations.
retention election proposal, commonly referred to as The Missouri
Plan.20
211
199. Id. at 1300.
200. See AMERICAN
STATES:

APPELLATE

JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE
at
COURTS,
JURISDICTION
GENERAL
AND

http://www.ajs.org/js/JudicialSelectionCharts-old.pdf (last visited Jan. 23,
2005) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
201. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 791 (2002)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that the Missouri Plan "reduce[d] threats
to judicial impartiality, even if it [did] not eliminate all popular pressure on
judges") (citing Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective
Judiciariesand the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 724 (1995)).
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Public opinion polling in regards to retention elections show
greater public acceptance of the concept but also reveals some
confusion. 2 The potential for a hybrid retentive/elective system of
judicial elections, in which candidates stand for retention election
after initial selection in a general election, is, in my opinion, more
likely to be adopted based on our public opinion research, but also
because I suspect that, with some clever legislative crafting, some
states may be able to adopt such a system without a constitutional
amendment.
While there may be greater acceptance of retention
elections than of selection strictly by appointment, one should not
be optimistic about the viability of this change. Even in states that
utilize retention election at some levels, expansion of this type of
selection method to other levels of the court has proven to be
problematic. In Florida, for example, where appellate judges are
already selected through merit appointment and retention
elections, a referendum to adopt the same system for their trial
court judges met with convincing defeat. 2°3

Twenty states use some form of judicial retention election
for appellate level judges, and twelve states use retention elections
for at least a portion of their trial court judges.' ° 4 Yet, while a
system of retention elections would address many general problems
associated with judicial selection, would it solve many of the
problems associated with judicial campaign speech? In my opinion,
perhaps not.
Consider that judges running in retention elections will still
have to campaign. What will they say? How will their speech be
governed? While retention elections seem to be less competitive
than standard candidate versus candidate elections, 2°' retention
202. Heagarty, supra note 71, at 1301.
203. See Anita Kumar, Referendum - Judicial Selection: FloridiansKeep
Right to Elect Judges, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 8, 2000, at 4B. For a more

detailed account of the Florida campaign for retention elections, see also Roy
A. Schotland, Financing Judicial Elections, 2000: Change and Challenge, L.
REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 849, 886-93 (2001).
204. B. Michael Dann & Randall M. Hansen, Judicial Retention
Elections, 34 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1429, 1443-44 (2001).
205. The nationwide historical percentage rates of judges defeated in
retention elections is about one percent. Id. at 1429-1430. Compare that to
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candidates must still raise money, speak to voters, and answer
questions from the public, the media, and special interest groups.
Are these elections not then still vulnerable to the types of abuse
described in Section IV?
Tennessee provides evidence that judges in retention
elections are not necessarily protected from political or outcomedeterminative criticism. In fact, they are just as vulnerable, if not
more so, to attack by special-interest electioneering. In 1996,
Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Penny White became the first
Tennessee judge not to be retained by the voters. Although White
received a favorable recommendation from the judicial evaluation
commission, a coalition of special-interest groups mobilized to
oppose her retention because of her stance in an emotionally
charged death penalty case. Pro- and anti-White coalitions were
formed and White was ultimately ousted. 206
The case of Penny White is especially valuable because it
reveals that the problems of unrestricted speech in judicial
campaigns, in this case the ability to criticize judges for unpopular
rulings, are not restricted to candidates. A similar case occurred in
Nebraska, where a justice who wrote an opinion striking down term
limits, which was agreed to unanimously by the state supreme court,
was targeted for defeat in a retention election by a statewide
organization backing term limits. After spending approximately
$200,000, compared to the justice's $80,000, numbers that cannot be
confirmed because the organization has not filed any disclosure
documents and claims it does not have to, the group opposing
retention of the justice succeeded in ousting the justice.7 These
North Carolina, where one of five incumbent appellate division judges was reelected

in

2002.

See

N.C.

State

Bd.

of

Elections,

at

http://www.sboe.state.nc.us/indexdata.html. Two of five incumbent appellate
divisions judges were re-elected in 2000. See N.C. State Bd. of Elections, at
http://www.sboe.state.nc.us/y2000elect/stateresults.htm (last visited Jan. 12,
2005) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
206. AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE
STATES: TENNESSEE, at http://www.ajs.org/js/TN.htm (last visited Jan. 23,
2005) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review). See also John Blume
& Theodore Eisenberg, Judicial Politics, Death Penalty Appeals, and Case
Selection: An EmpiricalStudy, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 465,471 (1999).
207. An Interview with Roy Schotland, CT. REV., Fall 1998, at 16.
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examples are extremely problematic for supporters of regulating
judicial campaign speech through codes of judicial conduct because
these codes do not, and cannot, regulate speech by non-candidates.
Issue advocacy organizations, political parties, and
independent political expenditures already account for a significant
share of judicial campaign advertising. 20 8 While steps have been
taken to regulate the activities of these organizations in North
and when
Carolina in terms of how they raise and spend Smoney
. 209
they can engage in "electioneering" communications, the content
of their advertising is not regulated. Thus, a situation exists where a
candidate, be it in a retention election or a standard election, can be
attacked by methods of campaign speech that would be forbidden
by an opposing candidate and is likely prohibited by the candidate
himself for use in his defense.
This unlevel playing field between candidates restricted by
canons and their own fundraising limitations and well-funded
special interest advocacy organizations, exists in states both with
North Carolina,
and without systems of retention elections.
however, has not yet seen the level of independent expenditure and
issue advocacy advertising documented in other states.210 In a
retention system, candidates are not opposed by other candidates
who would be subject to the same restrictions applied by the code
of judicial ethics. Rather, they face an "opposition committee,"
typically a state-authorized political committee that would not be
bound by similar restrictions as the retention candidate. Thus, it is
my opinion that this situation could invite more campaigning
outside of the conduct typically recognized by the canons as fair
and appropriate criticism of the judiciary and could pose a major
threat to judicial independence.
208. See also Justice at Stake Campaign, 2004 State Supreme Court
Elections

Monitoring

Project,

at

http://faircourts.org/contentViewer.asp?breadcrumb=3,500,502 (last visited
Jan. 12, 2005) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review); see generally
Press Release, Brennan Justice Center, Buying Time 2004: Judicial Election
Spending Nears $5 Million Dollar Mark (Oct. 6, 2004), available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/presscenter/releases_2004/pressrelease_2004_10
06.html.
209. Act of July 20, 2004, ch. 163, 2004 N.C. Sess. Law 125.
210. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 102.
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This is not to discount the many advantages of a retentionelection system that have not been discussed here. I only wish to
acknowledge that judges running under such systems would still be
vulnerable to unfair or irresponsible criticism. Whereas retention
elections may pose a solution to other problems of judicial
selection, they do not necessarily protect against the concerns to
judicial independence posed by election campaigns.
If an appointment-only system is not achievable at this time
and retention elections, despite their advantages in some areas, still
retain the campaign-speech related problems (with perhaps a
greater vulnerability associated with special interest attacks and
unfair judicial criticism), then how can we protect judicial
independence and still guarantee the First Amendment freedoms of
judicial candidates?
VI. MEETING THE CHALLENGES THROUGH JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN
CONDUCT COMMITFEES

The third suggested reform is one that, I believe, is both
immediately achievable and would directly meet the challenges to
judicial independence that earlier versions of North Carolina's
Code of Judicial Conduct sought to address. The creation and
proliferation of bodies known as independent judicial campaign
conduct committees could address cases of unfair judicial criticism
and irresponsible judicial campaign speech. They could also serve a
valuable role in improving public awareness and understanding of
the proper role of judges and the judiciary. I believe that such
committees have been proven somewhat effective in other states.
The best part of this suggested reform is that, if the correct
committee structure is utilized, it should be free of First
Amendment entanglements.
Again, I will return to this commentary's premise that some
forms of campaign speech are damaging to the public's faith and
confidence in an impartial and independent judiciary, but that
changes made to loosen restrictions on judicial campaign speech in
North Carolina were arguably made to ensure their legality under
the First Amendment and are unlikely to change anytime soon. I
turn to the concept of judicial campaign conduct committees as a
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method of countering the negative effects of harmful judicial
campaign speech primarily because of their ability to avoid the First
Amendment hurdles and obstruct other regulatory measures.
Even calling these committees "regulatory measures" is a
misnomer, for rather than restricting speech, they broaden it rather than regulating it, they build upon it. In fact, the very raison
d'etre of these committees is best explained by the remedy Justice
Kennedy provides within his concurrence with the White decision:
The legal profession, the legal academy, the
press, voluntary groups, political and civic
leaders, and all interested citizens can use their
own First Amendment freedoms to protest
statements inconsistent with standards of
judicial neutrality and judicial excellence.
Indeed if democracy is to fulfill its promise,
they must do so. They must reach voters who
are uninterested or uninformed or blinded by
partisanship, and they must urge upon the
voters a higher and better understanding of the
judicial function and a stronger commitment to
preserving its finest traditions.211
The concept of judicial campaign conduct committees is not
a new one. In fact, North Carolina could do well to examine the
models presented by states that have already adopted and
experimented with them.
A. Defining JudicialCampaign Conduct Committees

What exactly is a judicial campaign conduct committee?
Despite the many resource materials available to those interested in
212
establishing such an organization, there is no succinct definition of
211. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 795 (2002)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
212. And there are many. In my opinion, the best sources are the
websites established by the National Ad Hoc Advisory Committee on Judicial
Campaign Conduct of the National Center on State Courts, at
http://www.judicialcampaignconduct.org/, and by the A.B.A. Standing
Committee

on

Judicial

Independence,

at
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what a judicial campaign conduct committee actually is. They exist
in many different forms. One way to define these types of
committees is by what they actually do.
The ABA defines the work of a judicial campaign conduct
committee as follows:
These committees seek to improve the conduct
of judicial campaigns by promoting compliance
with the spirit and letter of the state canons of
judicial ethics that govern campaign speech and
conduct. Conduct, or oversight, committees
serve three primary functions: educating
candidates at the beginning of the campaign
about relevant judicial canons and campaign
finance regulations; reviewing campaign
materials in advance and answering candidates'
questions about campaign communications or
tactics; and, as a last resort, publicly disclosing
any instances of misconduct or referring
complaints to the official judicial discipline
entity.'2

Note the heavy reliance upon the canons for guidance. We
will come back to that later.
The National Ad Hoc Advisory Committee on Judicial
Campaign Conduct [hereinafter "the Ad Hoc Committee"] in their
guide, Effective Judicial Campaign Conduct Committee: A How-To
214
Handbook, defines these types of organizations in two ways. One
definition involves the organizations' goals:
1. To educate judges and judicial candidates
about ethical campaign conduct;
2. To encourage and support appropriate
campaign conduct, and work to deter
http://www.abanet.org/judind/resourcekit/conductcomm.html.
213. A.B.A. Standing Committee on Judicial Independence, supra note
212.
214. NATIONAL
CAMPAIGN

AD

CONDUCT,

Hoc

ADVISORY

EFFECTIVE

COMMITTEE

JUDICIAL

ON

CAMPAIGN

JUDICIAL
CONDUCT

COMMITTEE: A How To HANDBOOK 11 (Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts ed., 2004),
availableat http://www.judicialcampaignconduct.org/Handbook %20Final.pdf.
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inappropriate conduct;
3. To publicly criticize inappropriate conduct
that cannot otherwise be resolved; and,
4. To protect the public interest in having a fair
and impartial judiciary.
Furthermore, the Ad Hoc Committee defines the
organizations by what they do - educate judicial candidates about
appropriate campaign conduct, deter inappropriate campaign
conduct, and criticize inappropriate judicial campaign conduct that
does occur - and by what they do not do - endorse judicial

candidates or offer evaluations of judges.216
The Louisiana Judicial Campaign Oversight Committee,
which serves the same role as a judicial campaign conduct
committee, is defined through its charge to serve as a resource for
judges and judicial candidates: assist in educating judges and
judicial candidates about ethical campaign conduct and help deter
unethical judicial campaign conduct.

217

Blend all of these examples together and there emerges a
consensus that these committees exist to educate judges and judicial
candidates about appropriate campaign conduct and to criticize
inappropriate conduct. In addition, the committees may perform
other functions, such as reviewing campaign materials or statements
to screen them prior to release, acting as a deterrent to
inappropriate behavior (along the lines of "the best defense is a
good offense," to present a credible threat of sanction and no one
will test the committee), and issuing formal complaints to judicial
disciplinary committees.
Does anything seem missing here? One more thing to
which we will return.
The actual structure of such committees also varies slightly
depending upon whom you ask. The ABA divides possible
structures into two categories: official committees, which are those
established by state supreme courts, judicial disciplinary agencies,
or state bar associations in which membership is mandatory for
215. Id. at 4.
216. Id. at 9.
217. LA. SuP. CT. R. 35.
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lawyers, and unofficial committees, which are generally established
by local bar associations or state bar associations in which attorney
218
membership is voluntary.
I will take this opportunity to tweak my friends at the ABA
for a distinct bias towards (what else?) bar associations, reminding
them to keep in mind that there are other professional, academic,
and civic organizations that can play valuable leadership roles in
such an effort. While this may sound like a technicality, this is
actually an important point to address amongst other criticisms and
suggestions for a North Carolina model.
The Ad Hoc Committee corrects this oversight by including
in their listing of committee structures the official committees
sanctioned by the states' highest courts or mandatory bar
associations, unofficial committees run by state or local bars, and
unofficial committees run by civic organizations, such as the League
219
of Women Voters.
Barbara Reed, former counsel and policy director of the
Constitution Project, has written about these committees with Roy
Their article both categorizes the committees by how
Schotland.
they are organized and distinguishes them by the different powers
afforded such committees, resulting in three different types.
Committees in Florida, Ohio, Georgia, and Nevada are classified as
official committees, as they are sanctioned by their state supreme
courts and have some official disciplinary powers. Committees in
Alabama, Michigan, and South Dakota are considered quasiofficial committees and are either committees created by their
Supreme Courts, just like the "official committees" in other states,
or created via a mandatory bar's establishment of regional
The distinction is that the quasi-official committees
commissions.
lack the formal disciplinary powers of their official counterparts.

218. A.B.A. Standing Committee on Judicial Independence, supra note
212.
219. NATIONAL AD Hoc ADVISORY COMMITTEE HANDBOOK, supra
note 214, at 6.
220. Barbara Reed & Roy A. Schotland, Judicial Campaign Conduct
Committees, 35 IND. L. REV. 781 (2002).
221. Id. at 785-86.
222. Id. at 786-87.
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Unofficial committees, however, are organized solely by nongovernment entities, such as local bar associations.2 ' As such, they
lack the disciplinary powers available to the courts or mandatory
bars.
Regardless of precise definition, it is important to
distinguish between committees that are independent of the
government and those that are organized or operated by the
government. We can see this when we look at North Carolina and
its history of regulation of judicial campaign speech by different
types of review committees.
B. History of Campaign Conduct Committees in North Carolina
The idea of a group that monitors and regulates judicial
behavior is not new to our state. Judicial campaign speech
currently falls under the supervision of the North Carolina Judicial
Standards Commission, which is empowered to consider complaints
against judges and, where appropriate, to make recommendations
for censure or removal.2 4
The Commission's charge goes well beyond simply
monitoring and regulating judicial campaign speech, hearing all
complaints against judges and dispensing disciplinary action; but in
many ways it has served, in addition to all of its other functions, as a
de facto campaign conduct committee. As the commission is a
225
it would likely fall under the
construct of the government,
common definition of an official committee. It has been argued, as
part of the water-cooler talk about why North Carolina's codes of
judicial conduct were amended so drastically, that the
Commission's ability to restrict judicial campaign speech through
the threat of censure or removal from the bench could constitute a
223. Id. at 787.
224. See N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, Judicial Standards Comm'n,
at http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/Standards.asp (last updated

Mar. 6, 2002).
225. The seven-member commission is composed of three judges
appointed by the chief justice (a Court of Appeals judge, a Superior Court
judge, and a District Court judge), two attorneys appointed by the State Bar
Council, and two non-lawyer citizens appointed by the governor. Each
member serves a six-year term. Id.
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governmental denial of a First Amendment right. Thus, the
Commission's ability to regulate protected speech (under our
former codes of conduct) through sanction, it is argued, is
226
impermissible under the White decision.
Therefore, the argument goes that the codes of conduct, the
guidelines for what constitutes grounds for disciplinary action,' had
227
Court.
to be amended, according to the North Carolina Supreme
As a result, judicial speech - a concern for many scholars and
citizens - is now outside of the Commission's jurisdiction as
redefined in the new canons.
There are other precedents in North Carolina for both
official and unofficial committees. It is at this point, however, that I
would move to drop the term "unofficial committees" in favor of
the more descriptive term "private committees."
Private
committees, by my definition, are committees not affiliated with the
government and therefore are not bound by the same restrictions
levied against a governmental regulating body by the U.S.
Constitution and the First Amendment.
They may include
government officials but are organized and operate exclusively of
any government organization.
The earliest example of a private committee in North
Carolina was established in 1990 by the North Carolina Bar
Association (a voluntary bar 2) and chaired by former North
It
Carolina Supreme Court Chief Justice Rhoda Billings. 29
included twelve citizens of diverse gender, ethnicity, and
geographical and professional background, all of whom were

226. While I cannot attribute these general conversations around the
courthouse, I can provide some of the legal reasoning behind them. Professor
Lubet cites Oberholzer v. Commission on JudicialPerformance, 975 P.2d 663
(Cal. 1999), as evidence that even letters informing judges of ethical violations,
with no penalties or further consequences, require constitutional protections;
this suggests, I believe, that the harsher punishments granted to North
Carolina's Judicial Conduct Commission as options for sanction would also
require such protections. See Lubet, supra note 67, at 811.
227. See infra Parts II & III.

228. See N.C. Bar Ass'n, About the NCBA: History,
http://www.ncbar.org/about/history/index.aspx (last visited Jan. 12, 2005) (on
file with the First Amendment Law Review).
229. Reed & Schotland, supra note 220, at 787.

20041

157

POST WHITE DECISION WORLD

recognized and credible figures within their communities.130 The
group raised about $50,000 for their efforts, published over half a
million judicial candidate voter guides, and produced debates on
public television for the statewide judicial candidates.

231

While the

committee was organized by late August before the election and
232
Nor does
was ready to hear any complaints, none were made.
there appear to be any record of any judicial campaign behavior
that would have merited a complaint. It can reasonably be argued
that the commission might have deterred objectionable
campaigning, or it may simply have been that the candidates that
year all chose to follow a higher standard of behavior than
experienced at other times in other places. Regardless, an
important voter education role was served and the machinery was
in place to respond to controversial campaigning, had it surfaced.
However, the committee does not appear to have continued its
work in future elections.
A more recent investigation into establishing a private
committee was initiated in 2003 by Democracy North Carolina.
Bob Hall, co-executive director of this organization, assembled
former jurists, including former Chief Justices Rhoda Billings and
Henry Frye, representatives of the state's voluntary bar association,
prominent leaders of the state's legal community, and several civic
leaders to serve on the committee. 23 The group listened to
presentations from the Ohio State Bar Association about its efforts
to respond to unfair judicial criticism, destructive campaign tactics,
and irresponsible campaign speech deemed a threat to judicial
independence. 34 While the meeting did not produce an active
committee, the seeds were planted for future work. Democracy
North Carolina has begun a monitoring project of its own,
monitoring judicial campaign advertising and researching
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Telephone Interview with Bob Hall, Research Director, Democracy
North Carolina (Oct. 8, 2004).
234. For more information about the Ohio State Bar Association's
current campaign monitoring activities, see Ohio State Bar Ass'n, OSBA
Judicial Election Campaign Advertising Monitoring Committee Responds to
Complaint,at http://www.ohiobar.org/pub/?articleid=448 (Aug. 3, 2004).

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3

contributors to judicial races. 35 Meanwhile, the North Carolina
Center for Voter Education has begun an initiative to develop
judicial campaign conduct committees at a local level, to be detailed
later in this article.
Finally, the most recent organization to display the
organizational and functional characteristics of a judicial campaign
conduct committee in North Carolina is the Judicial Response
Committee, established by Chief Justice Lake's Commission on
Professionalism in 2003 and currently chaired by former North
Carolina Supreme Court Chief Justice Burley Mitchell, Jr.236 The
purpose of this bi-partisan committee of former governors, judges,
law school deans, and bar presidents is "to respond to unwarranted
attacks on judges by the media and public ....[,] to join in this nonpartisan effort to defend the members of our judiciary when they
are wrongly attacked ....[and] to respond to unwarranted attacks
within the same media cycle." 237 As the committee is made up
entirely of attorneys and is a construct of the government, it is best
labeled an official committee or, more accurately, a quasi-official

committee (as it has no official disciplinary power) rather than a
private committee.

It is interesting to note that, to date, the committee has
revealed publicly that it has heard three complaints and in each
case has declined to respond. 238 In one case, in which a complaint
was lodged against Doug Berger, a state industrial commissioner
who was running for a seat on the North Carolina Court of
Appeals, Sthe
committee feared a response would have exacerbated
•
239
the situation.
Berger, however, dropped out of his race for the
Court of Appeals and instead ran for state Senate after the
complaint became public.
235. Telephone Interview with Bob Hall, supra note 233.
236. See The N.C. Court System Judicial Response Committee, at
http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/Professionalism/Response.asp
(last updated Mar. 19, 2004) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
237. Id.
238. Matthew Eisley, Judicial Contests Watched, NEWS & OBSERVER

(Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 9, 2004, at 5B.
239. Id.
240. Lynn Bonner & Rob Christensen, A Candidate, Again,
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 25, 2004, at 5B.
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It is also interesting to note the language describing the
committee on the North Carolina court system website: "This
committee will not respond to all attacks on judges but does want
the superior and district court judges to know that there is a group
of lawyers and judges willing to stand up for their lawful actions and
to support them in the media whenever necessary. 2 4' This
language suggests that perhaps this committee was created in
response to criticism by the lower court judges, documented earlier,
242
of the weakened codes of judicial conduct.
Regardless of the motivations that may have prompted its
creation, the committee's existence is meritorious. The committee
would seem, however, to be limited in its activity and possibly
constrained by what it can do due to its affiliation with the
government, and because of the White decision.
C. A Planfor North Carolina

So then, given these examples and the advice offered by
national advocacy organizations and existing committees, what
should North Carolina do?
I believe judicial campaign conduct committees provide the
best course of action for North Carolinians interested in protecting
the judiciary and the public from the real problems identified
earlier resulting from irresponsible judicial campaign speech. Let
us look at how to construct a model North Carolina committee, why
some options are better than others, and how the committee can
address different problems that might arise.
A model judicial campaign conduct committee for North
Carolina should be a private committee, unaffiliated with the
government. Establishing private conduct committees requires no
legislative action, no public referendum, nor any of the other
barriers that might obstruct other suggested reforms. These
advantages alone make committees worthwhile, even if they are
nothing more than an interim step to take while pursuing a more
ambitious reform. Additionally, and perhaps most importantly in
241. See The N.C. Court System Judicial Response Committee, supra
note 236.
242. See Eisley, supra note 12.
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the context of this paper, the actions taken by a private group made
up of members of "[t]he legal profession, the legal academy, the
press, voluntary groups, political and civic leaders, and all
interested citizens... [using] their own First Amendment freedoms
to protest statements inconsistent with standards of judicial
neutrality and judicial excellence" 24 3' completely avoids the legal
entanglements over the freedom of political speech that so
concerned the Justices ruling in the majority in White.
A private committee meets speech with speech. It does not
hold any government sanction over the heads of candidates who
would be threatened with a restriction of their own speech or
punishment by their government. Clearly, the conduct of a private
committee should itself be responsible and comply with laws
regarding slander, libel, electioneering, and the like.
The
committee members themselves, however, retain the free speech
rights afforded to every citizen and can use the construct of the
committee as a platform for announcing their own views. Yes, the
establishment of private committees does sacrifice the power of a
government-backed sanction, but this does not leave the model
committee powerless by any means. Rather than becoming a
"pointless 'scolding commission,"' as Lubet cites as one of the
potential pitfalls of campaign conduct committees," the private
committee retains the ability, through its speech, to become a
potent voice on the bully pulpit, with the ability to affect election
outcomes.
The prospect of a government-sanctioned or
government-affiliated committee affecting election outcomes must
send up warning flares to anyone concerned with the First
Amendment. But such action by a group of private individuals,
done on their own time and of their own accord, is part of the
American political process and equally protected under the First
Amendment.
What exactly would a model committee in North Carolina
do?
Much like the functions identified earlier by other
organizations, its primary purpose should be to educate judges and
judicial candidates about appropriate campaign conduct and to
243. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 795 (2002)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
244. Lubet, supra note 67, at 811.
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criticize inappropriate conduct. Secondary purposes might include
the review of campaign materials or statements for appropriateness
prior to their release, issuing formal complaints to the North
Carolina Judicial Standards Commission when appropriate, and
acting as a deterrent to inappropriate behavior. However, just as
important as educating judges and judicial candidates is educating
the public, a function that is often forgotten at worst or at best
minimized by other organizations advocating for campaign conduct
245
committees.
It is a criticism I have made before, 24 but often the legal
community forgets about those citizens who are not lawyers but
who play, in states like North Carolina, a larger role in selecting
judges than lawyers do. Quite simply, if the general public
understood the role of the judiciary in the same context as most
attorneys, many of the campaign tactics that utilize pledges and
promises would not be as effective as they seem to be. But my
experiences suggest that the public often does not understand the
process by which a decision is reached and instead defines justice
and fairness by the outcome of a judge's decision. A model
campaign conduct committee should not simply suggest or dictate a
set of aspirational codes of behavior to judicial candidates and
chastise, in legal terms, those who deviate from it. Rather, the
committee should actively work to explain certain legal concepts to
the public, such as why indicating a preference for one class of
litigants over another is wrong, or why a judge cannot prejudge
drunken driving or child support cases or promise "zero tolerance"
without reviewing the facts of a specific case. So long as the public
views conflicts over the appropriateness of judicial campaign speech
as inside-baseball between legal scholars, jurists, and (to honor my
southern roots) "high-falutin"' attorneys, they will never
understand the seriousness of the problems identified earlier in this
article.
The public wants more information about judicial

245. See A.B.A. Standing Committee on Judicial Independence, supra

note 212; NATIONAL AD Hoc ADVISORY COMMITTEE HANDBOOK, supra note
214.
246. See generally Heagarty, supra note 71 (explaining the importance of
public opinion in electing judges).
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candidates 247 and, as demonstrated by Max Baer's campaign, unless
given a persuasive counter argument, they are apt to accept - even
praise - campaign behavior that gives them more information, even
if that information suggests bias or misleads them into expecting
specific decisions to be rendered by the judge.
Thus, the plan for a model committee in North Carolina
should include a public education component. Methods such as the
voter guide created by the 1990 North Carolina Bar Association
committee are one way this can be accomplished. A far less
expensive way, however, is to take advantage of the power of the
Internet. Internet voter guides, such as the ones created by the
North Carolina Center for Voter Education have drawn praise
from the media, candidates, and citizens. A model committee can
use a website (preferably with a memorable name that voters can
easily remember and access) as a clearing house for valuable voter
information about what to look for in judicial candidates, what the
exact duties of each specific judicial office are, what is appropriate
and inappropriate campaign behavior, and why such behavior is
considered appropriate or inappropriate. A website also helps to
establish permanence, providing a quick and easy resource for
candidates, so that the volunteer members of a private committee
are not deluged by numerous candidate queries or requests that
could be answered online. A website also serves as a good media
resource, which is an important factor considering that the
effectiveness of the committee is dependent upon favorable press
coverage.
Education of the judicial candidates themselves is not only
important, it should be considered essential. It would be unfair to
assess the behavior of the candidates if they have not been made
aware of the standards by which they are being judged. One
effective step a model committee could take would be to present
the standards of behavior being suggested by the committee and
asking all candidates to confirm that they have read and understand
the committee's standards. A further step would be to ask them to
sign a pledge to conduct their campaigns by these standards. The
Ad Hoc Committee's guide on judicial campaign conduct

247. Id.
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committees offers several recommended standards and also
presents what committees in other states have done, at a statewide
or county level, to encourage candidate adherence to their
standards.248
Organizations like the ABA and Ad Hoc Committee place
heavy emphasis on compliance with the spirit and intent of a state's
249
where the canons do
judicial canon of ethics. In North Carolina,
250
S .
•
in some areas
and
behavior,
campaign
much
restrict
not
specifically permit behavior that would violate the ABA's Model
211
Canons, such reliance on the state's canons for guidance is, in my
opinion, meaningless. Compliance with the North Carolina Code
of Judicial Conduct ought to be simply the ground floor from which
any deviation is completely unacceptable. A model committee in
North Carolina should aspire to a higher set of standards, perhaps
by adopting the ABA's model canons or, alternatively, the similar
252
standards put forth by The Constitution Project.
The structure of a model North Carolina committee will be
another factor affecting the standards the committee uses to
evaluate candidate campaign behavior and speech. Unlike past
attempts to create a judicial campaign conduct committee in North
Carolina, these committees should be created at a local level, as
opposed to a statewide level.
The 1990 ABA commission, the group commissioned by
Democracy North Carolina, and the sub-committee of the Chief
Justice's Commission on Professionalism were all organized to
248.

NATIONAL

AD

Hoc

ADVISORY

COMMITTEE HANDBOOK,

supra

note 214, at 25-7.
249. See sources cited supra note 212.
250. See generally N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2004), available at
http://www.aoc.state.nc.us/www/public/html/rulesjud.htm.
251. Compare MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5 (2004),
with N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7 (2004) (illustrating that
specific areas of conflict include whether a candidate should able to solicit
money directly and some level of political behavior. Some key components of
the ABA Code, such as restrictions against making pledges, promises, and
commitments on issues that may appear in court, no longer exist within the
North Carolina Code.).
252. THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, THE HIGHER GROUND: STANDARDS
OF

CONDUCT

FOR

JUDICIAL

CANDIDATES,

http://www.constitutionproject.org/ci/standards.pdf.

available

at
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review statewide campaign activity. However, there are several
successful models for committees organized on a much smaller
level, with many of these formed in cooperation with county bar
associations. 253 North Carolina has several active county- or
municipal-based bar associations, which could take up the task of
organizing committees on their own or could be important partners
in the organization of locally-based committees by other
organizations.
This local model relates to the standards by which a model
committee evaluates campaign speech and behavior in that it allows
local committees to take into account local community standards of
behavior. Standards for behavior can sometimes vary considerably
from place to place. What is considered perfectly acceptable in one
area of the country, or even within one area of the state, may be
shocking or scandalous elsewhere. While there are some basic
precepts that should be held in common no matter where a model
conduct committee is organized (such as those of the ABA model
canons), the specific standards for what is appropriate for
maintaining the integrity of the office might vary. This variation is
helpful if a model committee is to review campaigns of all levels of
the judiciary. What may be acceptable in a large urban community
may be less so in a conservative rural area, and vice versa.
Variation also gets at the importance of credibility, in that a
committee of respected local leaders who are widely known and
respected within the community may have more credibility with the
voters in a local trial court race than "outsiders" from the state
capital. The best of both worlds, of course, would be a committee
composed of members respected both locally and statewide, but
this is not always possible.
As mentioned, community-based bar associations, such as
the Wake County Bar Association254 and the Mecklenburg Bar

253. Local judicial campaign conduct committees exist in California,
Florida, New York, Ohio, and Washington. Details on each can be found at
http://www.judicialcampaignconduct.org/committees.htm (last visited Jan. 23,
2005) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
254. See Wake County Bar Ass'n, at http://www.lawsight.com/wcba.htm
(last visited Jan. 16, 2005) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
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Association,25 may be good places to start organizing. But what of
the rest of the state? Some of the smaller, more rural counties in
North Carolina simply do not have the resources for a committee,
and it is questionable how effective such committees would be.
Instead, committees eventually could be formed to represent the
various judicial districts around the state, so that, in some areas, a
committee could be formed from multiple counties that all belong
in the same district court, superior court, or prosecutorial districts.
Looking at maps of these districts, we see that there are over thirty
such districts at each level and that the different districts do not
neatly overlap.256 However, if local organizers can select one level
of the courts they think deserves more attention that the others, it
makes sense for them to organize around a common district where
they would all be reviewing the same set of candidates.
Such smaller committees, once they are established and
have worked out their kinks after an election cycle or two, are
perfect laboratories for discovering what does and does not work
and what an eventual statewide committee may look like. Rather
than starting with a statewide committee that might not be able to
sustain itself, I feel that creating one or two model committees
based around a county bar association or a judicial district will build
the kind of local support and track record for success that is
necessary to convince a larger audience to accept this innovation
These committees can also fulfill the
without uncertainty.
extremely valuable role of educating the voting public about trial
court judges and monitoring their behavior in a way that might not
be possible for a statewide committee without multiple
255. See Mecklenburg County Bar, at http://www.meckbar.org (last
visited Jan. 16, 2005) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
256. Institute of Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel
Court
N. C.
District
Hill,
http://www.iog.unc.edu/library/judicial/jpgs/DistCt01.jpg

Districts,
(Jun. 30,

at
2001);

Institute of Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, N.C.
Districts,
Prosecutorial
http://www.iog.unc.edu/library/judicial/jpgs/PrDist01.jpg

(Jun.

30,

at
2001);

Institute of Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, N.C.
at
Divisions,
and
Court
Districts
Superior
http://www.iog.unc.edu/library/judicial/jpgs/SupCtOl.jpg (last modified Jun. 30,
2001).
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representatives in the various judicial districts.
Whether the decision is made to start locally and build
incrementally or to try to establish a statewide committee, North
Carolina will benefit. While it may be preferable to start locally,
the alternative would not be counter-productive or lead to failure.
To summarize, a model committee in North Carolina should
be private, and should be organized at the local level initially. The
committee should work to educate judicial candidates about
community standards for appropriate judicial campaign behavior.
It should play a proactive public education role, teaching voters
about the special functions of the judicial branch and how and why
it is different from the legislative and executive branch. The
committee should respond to irresponsible campaign speech and
behavior to alert voters and the media that such behavior is wrong
and why it is wrong. Also, a committee could take up matters
independently or could be complaint-driven. Once the committee
has been established and its existence is known, the best way to
operate and help preserve the integrity of the committee is to be
complaint- or inquiry-driven, rather than proactively judging these
campaigns. Having a pool of monetary resources to draw from can
increase the operating options available to a committee, but the
committee can be established and can operate on very little money.
Most of its activities will be in the form of speaking directly with
candidates and communicating with the media, though the
committee may choose to take on other voter education functions.
The construction of a model committee is relatively simple.
The options for its structure and function are known, but what will
determine if the committee is successful?
A viable committee needs only two things in order to be
successful: credibility and dedicated, diligent members. Because
the true power of a private committee is in its ability to speak out
against inappropriate speech, rather than levy some official
sanction, it is important that when the committee makes a
statement it is both heard and heeded. The best way to accomplish
these goals is through a committee membership and spokesperson
with a high degree of credibility that will not be seen as partisan or
biased towards a particular interest.
Credibility is essential. The model committee must be seen
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as fair and not motivated by partisan concerns. Its members must
be well known and respected. If the committee is based in a county
or city, it is important that the majority, if not all, of its members be
local. Committee membership must be balanced. A committee
filled with too many powerful attorneys from the local bar could be
seen as a group of "establishment insiders," while, at the same time,
a group of activists or reformers without sufficient representation
from the bar could be seen as "rabble-rousing outsiders." In either
case, it is likely that the credibility of the committee would be
compromised and that the group would suffer public backlash
against its recommendations. There is no universal definition of
what constitutes an insider or outsider, and thus it is important to
listen to local voices on the matter.
The issue of neutrality can be sticky, and the issue is one of
the other pitfalls Lubet warns against when establishing these types
of committees.27 Ideally, all committee members who serve would
agree to refrain from making any judicial campaign contributions,
endorsements, or fundraising appeals. Obviously, those individuals
most concerned about judicial campaigns are typically primary
candidates for committee membership, but they are also the
individuals most likely to make contributions to judicial candidates.
Their abstinence in this regard, however, will improve the
credibility of the committee, and their committee membership
provides them a solid excuse not to make campaign contributions.
If committee members really feel the need to participate in the
process through their own philanthropy, perhaps they could make
their contributions toward the committee's work instead.
Lubet's concern is, I feel, based on the suggestion that for a
committee to be neutral it must be disinterested. I disagree and
would argue that the absence of political interest is not the only
guarantee of neutrality. A committee having equal and balanced
political interests would also be valid. Committee members can be
noted members of political parties, provided there is bipartisan
balance among the members. Through opinion research on topics
such as campaign finance reform, we have found the importance of
bipartisanship in delivering messages and in choosing
257. Lubet, supra note 67, at 815-16.
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spokespersons.
Uniting prominent Democrats and Republicans behind one
message can be powerful and persuasive, even if partisan voters
express a strong dislike for one side or the other.28 Rather than
trying to form a model committee of apolitical individuals, I believe
a more successful strategy would be to unite well-known and
respected public figures who may be political but who are part of a
balanced group designed to show united bipartisan support.
Finally, in order to establish credibility with the majority of
the voting public, it is important that the model committee feature
non-attorneys. Public opinion concerning attorneys in North
Carolina shows a very slight negative bias towards attorneys and
their opinions on political issues. 219 Because it is the general voting
population, not simply the legal community, who will be voting on
these judges, it is important that the model committee have nonattorney members who are widely recognized and respected and
who are able to comment on these issues. I would conclude from
our research data that the expressed views of a committee
composed solely of lawyers would be viewed slightly more
negatively than positively by the general public. The Ad Hoc
Committee concurs that all-lawyer committees may have limited
credibility with the larger public and "may... raise concerns that
lawyers might promote personal or political agendas through their
committee decisions." 260 The committee makes the important point
that "non-lawyers also are heavily affected by a state's judiciary and

258. MICHAEL VASu, N.C. CENTER FOR VOTER EDUCATION, CAMPAIGN
REFORM IN NORTH CAROLINA 27 (2000) (on file with the N.C. Center for
Voter Education and the First Amendment Law Review).
259. N.C. Center for Voter Education, Strategic Analysis and Messaging
(Feb. 19-21, 2000) (unpublished survey, on file with the N.C. Center for Voter
Education). The N.C. Center for Voter Education conducted a telephone
survey of 800 registered voters in the state of North Carolina who were
screened for likelihood of participation in the next general election. The
margin of error for this survey is plus or minus 3.4 percent. The sample
population was scientifically selected to meet rigid criteria of random selection

and geographical allocation. Appropriate weights were assigned to bring data
into line with known and presumed demographic characteristics.
260. NATIONAL AD HOC ADVISORY COMMITTEE HANDBOOK,

note 214, at 7-8.
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have important interests in the tone of campaigns.
Bringing together former legislators, governors, or local
government leaders with leaders of the business, civic, and religious
community can form a solid pool of non-lawyers to add to the
leaders in the legal community needed to properly form a model
committee. Geographic and demographic diversity, in addition to
political diversity, will strengthen the credibility of the committee in
the eyes of various communities.
But the fundamental quality needed in every potential
member of a model committee is dedication to the work of the
committee. As a volunteer organization, it is essential that all
members are prepared to attend meetings, participate in conference
calls, or communicate regularly through whatever means are
required. Members are free to have a healthy, spirited debate over
individual cases they may consider, but all members must be willing
to back the majority decisions of the committee. The workload of a
committee will vary from year to year depending upon the number
of races on the ballot in a given election and, of course, the specific
behavior or speech exercised by candidates. An active, vigilant
Potential committee
committee is an effective committee.
members should be made aware of this upfront and their
commitment should be secured before naming them to the
membership.
While all the details of the Berger case mentioned above in
relation to Chief Justice Lake's subcommittee are not known, it is
entirely possible that the committee's actions contributed to the
candidate's decision to drop out of the race. Though not wielding
the power of official government sanction, judicial campaign
conduct committees do possess a tremendous amount of power that
can be used effectively to dissuade, deter, and, if necessary, respond
to campaign speech and conduct that would violate the standards of
conduct needed to ensure judicial independence. Such power must
be wielded responsibly, as actions that are interpreted as endorsing
candidates or engaging in electioneering activities pose a real
danger to the committee. Committees must address specific
incidents of speech and conduct and otherwise remain removed

261. Id. at 8.
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from the political process.
The establishment of private judicial campaign conduct
committees has great potential in North Carolina to address issues
of campaign speech not currently allowable under the state's
current canons of judicial conduct. Not only can these committees
respond to and address actions by candidates, they can directly
respond to attacks by special interest groups and non-candidates,
something the canons are currently powerless to address. By
meeting campaign speech with more speech, everyone concerned
about judicial independence and the integrity of judicial elections
can answer far more threats than they could by attempting to find
remedies under the codes of conduct or currently allowable under
state law. By addressing speech with more speech, privately
organized groups can actively engage and educate the public in the
importance of the judiciary and the importance of concepts like
impartiality and due diligence, without running afoul of the First
Amendment.
VII. CONCLUSION & POSTSCRIPT

No reform is perfect, and every problem associated with
judicial campaigns cannot be solved while there remains so much
262
debate over what does and does not actually constitute a problem.
However, establishing private judicial campaign conduct
committees provides a positive, practical, and, most of all,
achievable step towards reform. With minimal costs, and without
the prerequisites of government sanction, a committee with strong
leadership can be organized and activated within a matter of
months.
North Carolina amended its Judicial Code of Conduct
following the White decision, and North Carolina just experienced
its first elections under the revised codes. As this article has been
written, the campaign tactics of various candidates in these races
262. Other options may still be considered as long-term solutions. I did
not discuss other issues such as strengthened recusal standards or establishing
some sort of system of judicial candidate evaluation. However, the reform I
am proposing would not conflict with any of these other ideas, both of which
are worth exploring.
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has become clearer. For example, one newspaper account detailed
how four appellate division judicial candidates were stating their
personal positions on such issues as abortion, the death penalty, gay
marriage, and displaying the Ten Commandments in public
buildings, with three of them campaigning "vigorously" on those
issues.263 What trends in campaigning emerge, and whether
candidates limit themselves to announcing their views, rather than
pledging or promising specific results in future decisions remains to
be seen. Based on the success of Edward Brady in his 2002
campaign for North Carolina Supreme Court, it is not unreasonable
to assume that, free from any judicial codes of conduct restricting
them from such behavior, some candidates will follow his lead.
However, if those who believe that the integrity and
independence of the judiciary are threatened by irresponsible
campaign speech that suggests pledges and promises of future court
decisions are correct, then taking important steps toward reform
now will protect us from hazards later. If they are not correct, and
unrestricted judicial campaign speech poses no threat and is in fact
beneficial to public debate, then by establishing judicial campaign
conduct committees we have only added to that discourse and
increased the information available to the voters, further benefiting
the public.
It is rare to develop public policy that can truly be
considered a "win-win" solution. But no matter which side one
takes in the debate over what constitutes responsible judicial
campaign speech, judicial campaign conduct committees in North
Carolina would seem to present a solution with no downside. In
the spirit of the White decision, this author would like to formally
announce his belief that they do.

263. Matthew Eisley, Bench Hopefuls Bank On PersonalBeliefs, NEWS &
(Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 31,2004, at lB.
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